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

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ABSTRACTS/RESUMES

K. W. Foley and E.H. Brezina, **Crucial Elements in Future Urban Transportation Policy**

Our cities, their physical form and the technology used to service them were largely shaped by inexpensive and abundant supplies of energy, capital, and manpower. It is imperative to develop alternative forms for continued urban growth which are appropriate to the unique demographic, economic, and resource constraints of the next 20 years.

To begin, strategic goals for energy supply and consumption, environmental quality, and economic development must be established. Concurrently, policy development in these areas must be convergent upon this long-term multi-sector strategy. Five primary strategic development issues which have an impact on the choice of appropriate urban transportation systems investment are identified. The challenge to urban and economic planners is to adopt such long-range methodology as the context for urban development concepts and policies.

D. Paul Emond, **Resolving Development Decision-making, Ontario Style**

Decision-making about major resource developments in Canada has virtually ground to a halt. Doubt and uncertainty about the future is expressed by many members of society, including government. This, combined with increased demands from the *public* to participate meaningfully in decision-making that affects their lives, makes decisions about *need,* siting, and technology particularly difficult. Government ambivalence about the decision-making process is reflected in a multitude of overlapping and sometimes even conflicting regulatory processes. Citizens are determined not to be excluded from important decisions and that means that well-financed groups and individuals are using every

K. W. Foley et E.H. Brezina, **Données éssentielles pour un politique des transports urbains de l'avenir**

Nos villes, leur physionomie et la technologie mise à leur service doivent en grande partie leur forme à l'abondance et au bas prix des ressources en énergie, en capital et en main-d'oeuvre. Une alternative s'impose si l'on veut développer des formes appropriées à une croissance urbaine continue en rapport avec les restrictions démographiques et économiques et avec le tarissement des ressources qui marqueront spécifiquement les vingt prochaines années.

Il faut pour commencer fixer des buts stratégiques quant à la consommation et au ravitaillement en énergie, quant à la qualité de l'environnement et au développement économique. En même temps, on doit avoir un plan d'action cohérent en ces domaines, en vue de cette stratégie à long terme et sur secteurs multiples. On peut repérer cinq voies essentielles dans ce processus stratégique qui impliquent le choix d'investissements adéquats aux systèmes de transport urbain. Le défi posé aux planificateurs économiques et aux urbanistes est d'adopter une telle méthodologie à long terme comme contexte à une politique et à un concept de développement urbain.

D. Paul Emond, **Comment résoudre les problèmes de décision sur la mise en valeur, à la mode ontarien**

Le Canada en est pratiquement arrivé à un point mort quant au processus de prise de décision sur la mise en valeur des ressources principales. Bien des membres de notre société, y compris le gouvernement, expriment leur hésitation et leur incertitude sur l'avenir. Cette situation et l'insistance croissante du public à jouer un rôle véritablement actif dans les processus de prise de décision qui conditionnent sa vie, rendent particulièrement délicates les prises de

forum available to them, including the regulatory boards and the courts. Ontario Hydro's Bruce to Milton 500 kV transmission line provides a vivid illustration of both how confused the regulatory process is and how effective determined opposition can be. Reform of the decision-making process is needed. But it cannot be reform that turns back the clock to pre-public awareness days. Reform must reflect the public's right to participate, rationalize the present regulatory nightmare, and provide the public and private sectors with final decisions about major development proposals. Ontario is on the verge of reforming the process with its new *Environmental Assessment Act.* What needs to be done to complete the reform and to start making decisions again is 1) eliminate the overlap between this Act and those in the municipal and regional planning, energy and expropriation fields, 2) make appointments to the Environmental Assessment Board that recognize its potential, and 3) stop exempting important proposals, such as the Darlington Nuclear Power station, that the Act was specifically designed to deal with.

***John H. Bradbury,* Instant Resource Towns Policy in British Columbia, 1965-1972**

In 1965 the British Columbia government enacted legislation to facilitate changes in the social and economic fabric of that province's single enterprise settlements. The legislation provided for the enfranchisement of town residents, community planning, and changes in home ownership and financing of townsites. It was also expected that demographic changes and improvements in social conditions would occur. This paper examines the background, the political economy, and the implementation of legislation and planning policy. An assessment is made of the viability of policy within the constraints of the staples extraction economy of British Columbia. The policy implemented in 1965 could achieve only certain limited changes. Several older company towns were replaced by modern

position au sujet de la nécessité d'une exploitation, de son emplacement et de la technologie utilisée. Une foule de procédures de contrôle qui se recoupent et parfois même se contredisent reflètent l'ambivalence du gouvernement dans le processus de prise de décision. Les citoyens sont décidés à ne pas se laisser exclure des décisions importantes, et cela signifie que des groupes qui bénéficient de ressources importantes ainsi que de simples particuliers mettent à profit toutes les tribunes auxquelles ils ont accès y compris les commissions de contrôle et les tribunaux. En Ontario, la ligne de transmission d'énergie hydro-électrique de 500 kV de Bruce à Milton est une parfaite illustration de la confusion des procédures de contrôle et de l'efficacité d'une opposition déterminée. On doit sérieusement réviser le processus de prise de décision. Mais il ne saurait s'agir d'une réforme qui équivaudrait à une régression à des temps antérieurs à l'éveil de conscience publique. La réforme doit refléter le droit du public à la participation, rationaliser le cauchemar actuel des contrôles et fournir aux secteurs privé et public des décisions finales sur les projets de développement essentiels. L'Ontario est sur le point de réformer sa procédure, avec sa nouvelle *Loi sur la Prospective d'environnement.* Pour achever la réforme et recommencer à pouvoir prendre des décisions, on doit: 1) éliminer les recoupements entre cette loi et celles de la planification municipale et régionale, dans les domaines de l'énergie et de l'expropriation, 2) faire des nominations à la Commission de la Prospective d'environnement de membres qui en reconnaissent les possibilités d'action, 3) arrêter d'exempter des projets importants, comme la Centrale Nucléaire de Darlington, à l'intention desquels la loi avait été spécialement conçue.

***John H. Bradbury,* La Politique de l'urbanisme dans les villes champignon de ressources naturelles en Colombie-Britannique, 1965-1972**

En 1965, le gouvernement de la Colombie-Britannique a mis en vigueur une législation visant à faciliter l'évolution des strucinstant towns. Residents were involved in municipal councils and civic elections. Yet these were essentially cosmetic changes. Dependence on a single company and a single resource remained and with it many of the social problems that government and town planners had hoped to alleviate.

tures socio-économiques dans les communautés régies par une seule entreprise dans cette province. Cette législation prévoyait l'attribution du vote aux résidents des villes, l'aménagement collectif ainsi que la modification au régime de la propriété et au financement des infrastructures. On prévoyait également un changement démographique et une amélioration des conditions sociales. Cette étude traite des données générales du problème, des implications économiques et politiques, et de la mise en oeuvre de cette législation et de la planification. On en examine aussi la viabilité, compte tenu des exigences que pose en Colombie-Britannique l'économie de l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. La politique mise en oeuvre en 1965 n'a pu réaliser que des changements limités. Plusieurs anciennes villes patronales ont été remplacées par des villes champignon modernes, avec participation des résidents aux conseils municipaux et aux élections civiles. Pourtant, il ne s'agit guère que de changements de façade. Ces villes sont restées dépendantes d'une compagnie et d'une ressource uniques, ce qui signifie la permanence de bien des problèmes sociaux auxquels le gouvernement et les urbanistes avaient espéré porter remède.

***Howell S. Baum,* The Uncertain Consciousness of Planners and the Professional Enterprise**

One requirement for professionalization is that practitioners share a consciousness of a common purpose and common interests. A sample of United States planners was interviewed about their self-perceptions. Responses were similar to those of the Environmental Planning in Canada study. Planners are uncertain about how to describe what they do, what ethical principles they follow, what they have in common, and how they differ from other practitioners. Consequently, they are ambivalent about organizing for professionalization. The article interprets difficulties in describing planning as a product of the conflict between planners' role model of an independent problem-solver and the realities of planners' employment as advisors in bureaucratic organizations.

***Howell S. Baum,* L'Incertitude des planificateurs et l'entreprise professionnelle**

Une des conditions requises pour la professionnalisation est que les praticiens partagent la conscience d'un but commun et d'intérêts communs. Lors d'un sondage réalisé aux Etats-Unis sur l'idée que se font d'eux-mêmes les planificateurs, on a obtenu des réponses équivalentes à celles que donne l'étude de la planification de l'environnement au Canada. Les planificateurs ne savent trop comment décrire ce qu'ils font, à quels principes éthiques ils obéissent, ce en quoi ils se rapprochent et en quoi ils diffèrent des autres praticiens. Ce n'est donc pas sans ambiguité qu'ils envisagent l'organisation de la professionnalisation. Cet article illustre les difficultés que pose la description de la planification comme produit du conflit entre le rôle theorique du planificateur qui résoud des problèmes à titre indépendant et les réalités de son emploi comme conseiller d'organisations bureaucratiques.

Crucial Elements in Future Urban Transportation Policy*

K.W. Foley and E.H. Brezina

The Evolution of Energy and Urban Transportation Issues

Throughout the fifties and sixties, the increasing availability of energy at declining real prices was a major factor shaping rapid economic growth and industrial development, the form of our cities and buildings, and the means of mobility within cities. However, by the mid-seventies this rapidly growing energy demand was shocked by sudden energy price increases, uncertainties in energy supply, and concern for deteriorating air and water quality.

The initial public policy response to this compound crisis included the promulgation of legislation requiring *adaptation* of existing or replacement stock to higher energy prices and changing supply patterns. Modifications were introduced to increase the efficiency and environmental acceptability of energy-consuming urban stock, e.g., automobile fuel economy and emissions standards, home insulation techniques, and conversion to alternative fuels in the industry. Regulation of the environmental consequences of energy production and use has become an increasingly important part of energy policy. Air and water quality, oil spills, strip mining, and the safety of nuclear reactors are perhaps the most important concerns affected by energy production and use. Increasingly stringent standards in these areas are often cited as contributing to the increasing cost or decreasing availability of energy.

Beyond these short-term interventions, however, *strategic* measures involving the design and construction of more efficient additions to our urban capital and technology stock must become a priority. The magnitude of these additions is such that they will (within our lifetimes) dominate the urban stock and therefore long-term energy demand and the quality of environment achievable in our future urban living space. In the absence of a definite effort to explore the strategic perspective, there will continue to be insufficient basis for assessing the merit of our short-term measures, or for coordinating the longer term policy choices.

During the past decade, it has been assumed that the incremental adaptive strategy would be a sufficient response to the energy price and environmental quality crises. In the transportation sector, attention has focussed on developing cost-effective variations in the *components* of the existing system to achieve reduced petroleum consumption and reduced pollution. It was assumed that continued investment in the basic structural patterns of urban growth, industrial development, and the forms of urban utilities and transportation services remains justified as the long-term baseline.

With few exceptions, transportation policy is focussed on short-term investment and budgetary planning. Transportation investment, however, involves public capital structures with very long economic lifetimes. For example, the investment decisions being considered today in high-capacity roadways and high level-of-service transit systems involves structures that will be at the midpoint of their lifetimes in 2020 A.D. (about thirty years after their construction). Yet these investment analyses continued to assume:

- ☐ Long-term availability and affordabili-

*An earlier version of this article was presented as a workshop theme paper to the Urban Transportation Policy Research Conference, Washington, May 1979.

ty of liquid fuels;

- Long-term suburban residential density and job location trends;
- Long-term environmental quality improvement through technological improvements;
- Long-term suitability to the population age structure and income levels;
- Long-term suitability to post-OPEC economic growth policies; and
- Continued growing fiscal capacities of both public and private sector consumers and investors.

Until recently there has been little doubt about long-term assumptions or strategic objectives. But this last decade of policy crises has left its mark. Today there is a recognition at both federal and provincial transportation policy levels that four major considerations *are likely* to render the present automobile-dominated urban-system investment vulnerable to external changes during its mature (post-2000 A.D.) phase.[1] These considerations are:

- uncertainty about the post-2000 A.D. energy supply future;
- shortage of investment capital if there is a need to implement alternative large-scale energy production distribution and utilization systems;
- shortage of investment capital to sustain the present energy consumption rates and at the same time create a lower national energy consumption profile; and
- uncertainty about the environmental consequences of increasing production and consumption of lower grade fossil fuels.

Canadian energy studies, for example, continue to assume economically optimistic long-range projections which assume doubling of car ownership and tripling of urban travel to be offset by equally optimistic mile per gallon fuel economy standards.

What this euphoric policy set fails to consider is whether such doubling of auto ownership or tripling of urban travel is desirable as a longer-term economic and environmental objective. Further, it fails to consider whether the recessionary economy could sustain the cost of providing and maintaining the enormous public investment in additional roadway capacity needed to accommodate this volume of urban traffic.

Policy research today fails to provide our decision-makers with the systemic implications of long-term energy strategies needed to maintain an increasing standard of living under higher energy cost conditions. It fails to indicate *when* critical choices in land use policy, industrial development, building patterns, and means of transportation in urban areas would have to be made if best advantage is to be taken from the substantial additions to urban stock which will occur in the next decades.[2]

This article outlines the strategic transportation issues which will be influenced by our choices in energy, urban, and economic development policy.

Until substantial policy decisions are taken on how the transition will be made from declining energy sources to new, higher-priced but less-limited sources of energy, it will not be possible to achieve convergence between our transportation investment and our urban development patterns. Reciprocally, until substantial policy decisions are taken on the geographic patterns of our industrial and economic development in relation to our environmental quality objectives, urban transportation policy must emphasize retaining options for achieving an energy-efficient future. Taken together, such coordinated decisions would define a strategy for the post-OPEC urbanization future in Canada.

Strategic Issues in Coordinated Public Policy Research

To provide perspective on how energy policy alternatives, environmental protection goals, and economic development priorities constrain urban transportation policy choices, we shall focus on the urban transportation policy development process. In a schematic form, this policy process depends upon prior assumptions about economic development and energy strategy, which in turn influence decisions about the most suitable forms and patterns of urban development; these in turn determine the most appropriate public investment in services, including investment in public transportation. This relationship is illustrated in Figure 1.

Figure 1



The reassessment of Canadian urban development and energy strategies provoked by the energy and environmental crisis of the 1970s highlights five critical issue areas which require accelerated policy research. These are:

- ☐ The Mobility Issue: Will current patterns of urban transportation investment—over their economic lifetimes—meet the long-term transportation needs of our cities?
- ☐ The Energy Supply Issue: What impact will a major transition to alternative energy sources have on urban housing and transportation system investment requirements?
- ☐ The Development of Options Issue: Will our options in energy supply, environmental quality, and economic development be preserved in current urban transportation investment plans?

Dealing with these substantive issues in the strategic perspective places a strain on the current practice of policy research coordination and analyses. This, in turn, raises two primary issues regarding policy research:

- ☐ The Goals Issue: How do you coordinate multi-sector policy analysis?
- ☐ The Methodology Issue: What are the major changes needed in analytical techniques to accommodate long-term policies?

A redefinition of an appropriate urban transportation policy research agenda for Canada in the next five years requires an elaboration of the questions inherent in each of the five primary issue areas cited above. The questions posed represent the *new spectrum of externalities* which define the appropriate context for wise allocation of public investment funds.

The identification of this new context, and the determination of new critical linkages between our long-term social and economic objectives and the urban transport sector, are essential to an effective urban development strategy based on mutually-reinforcing policies.

Without this underlying policy research context, the creation of such an alternative urban development paradigm is limited to mere scenario construction, lacking the rigor of attempted verification of its feasibility of implementation.

The following sections are intended to challenge the traditionally narrow focus of government policy research programs by introducing relevant questions which have been raised in other (seemingly independent) policy sectors, but which have not been brought together under a coordinated urban policy agenda. This failure of policy coordination is not limited to the urban transportation sector but the evolution of this sector is so critical to the financial viability of our local governments, that it is particularly illustrative of the need for planning coherence and a whole systems perspective.

THE MOBILITY ISSUE: Are current urban transportation investment plans appropriate to longer-term mobility needs?

Three primary factors for judging the appropriateness of major capital investment projects in the public sector are its coordination with social, financial, and economic needs. Questions critical to the transportation policy process therefore include demographic change, capital replacement costs, and industrial sector evolution.

Will urban capital investment in transportation facilities coincide with the changing age structure of the population and the resultant changing needs for social investment? Will the changing housing and local services needs of the post-war baby boom population be satisfactorily serviced by the automotive and freeway investment commitment of the seventies and eighties? Does this highway investment imply constrained mobility for an aging population? What level of public transportation services will be required for a disproportionately dependent population? How can that need be anticipated and provided for? Where will it be needed?

Can the costs of maintaining, reconstructing, and replacing the present capital and energy-intensive transportation facilities be met over the planned lifetime of the system? What is the financial feasibility of reconstructing and expanding urban road systems (which were built during a period of relatively low-cost energy and road-building materials), under conditions of higher costs and when there are simultaneous unprecedented demands for public capital for energy production and distribution?

Over the past twenty-five years' historically high rates of urbanization, population, labor force, and industrial growth provided the means to replace obsolete capital-intensive systems through high rates of economic growth. These high growth rate factors and scenarios will not likely be operative during the next twenty-five years and therefore broader decisions about *choices* between meeting both current and longer-term needs on a national basis will be necessary. The unprecedented fall-off in birth rates after the baby-boom indicates a major contraction in the labor force supply which coincides with the exceptional costs of servicing the unusually large dependent population. This long-range economic concern has motivated the Science Council of Canada[3] to adopt a policy advocating more competitive, high-productivity, high-technology industries in the 1980s. Without such a shift in industrial strategy, the Council foresaw an impossible burden of accumulated debt, public capital requirements, and servicing loads bearing upon a diminished work force. Similar long-term transportation investment conclusions were reported in the study *U.S. Transportation Trends and Choices to the Year 2000.*[4]

THE ENERGY SUPPLY ISSUE: What impact will the transition to alternative energy sources (e.g., coal, nuclear, solar, or synthetic petroleum) have on patterns of urban transportation?

Energy supply policy is critical to the long-term growth prospects of the Canadian economy. Canada's anticipated massive need for capital investment in both energy supply and conservation projects will have a profound impact on employment in other sectors, inflation, urban environmental quality, and international relations.[5] However, there is little debate in the field of strategic energy planning over the impact of alternative energy sources on economic and urban development. There is even less attention given to the substantial urban infrastructure investment demands which would be necessary to utilize alternative urban energy sources within the next three decades.[6]

Transition to more economical and reliable energy consumption will require substantial change in building design and urban housing and employment patterns. None of this cost is included in the current estimates of conversion to alternatives.

What do we know about the effect of alternate energy futures on urban transportation? Two major studies, The U.S. Academy of Sciences *Report of the Consumption, Location, and Occupational Patterns Group*[7] and the Canadian position paper to the United Nations Conference on Energy Considerations in the Planning and Development of Human Settlements,[8] conclude that any lower-energy consumption option, including continued commitment to petroleum, will require major improvements in the total energy-efficiency of the automobile system and a much greater role for higher-density public transportation services.

A reduced national energy budget (imposed by higher energy extraction, distribution, and consumption costs) requires major energy reductions in the buildings and services sector in order to leave room for growth of the industrial sector.[9] Housing and transport sector reductions will necessarily involve higher density development and travel patterns which will restructure the transportation services market.

Such pursuit of low energy futures introduces urban design as the most important single *strategic* determinant of energy consumption. Keeping this urban design and investment option open is the critical long-term energy conservation issue which must be addressed before the opportunity for redesign via the household formation boom of the 1980s passes.

Just as the post-war transition from high cost solid fuels (coal and wood) to lower-cost petroleum dramatically influenced the last twenty-five years of urbanization, we can expect accelerated change towards new patterns of housing, transport and industry appropriate to high cost new sources of energy. The urban implications of specific fuel types, including their impact on housing forms, density, and spatial orientation is a significant missing element in energy policy research.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF OPTIONS ISSUE: Will our options in energy supply, environmental quality, and economic development be preserved in current urban transportation investment plans?

We need to know *when* our available options in energy, environment, and transport policy should be pursued in order to achieve energy-efficiency and economy in our urban development. The opportunity to influence urban design is greatest in growth periods (when there are regular additions to labor force and capital stock) and least when capital investment only replaces deteriorating stock. The household formation stage of evolution of the post-war baby boom is such an opportunity.

On the other hand, the capacity to build new urban stock is greatest when there is a good supply of capital for investment relative to servicing expenditures. Our demographic and econometric models indicate that we can expect growing capital shortage problems in the 1990s as a result of our falling industrial productivity and growing population dependence-ratios; all of which is compounded by the unprecedented costs of replacing traditional energy supply sources.[10]

Taken together, we find that the opportunity of a household formation boom of the 1980s and the capital constraint conditions of the 1990s necessitate that if more efficient urban housing and transport stock is to be largely in place by 2010 A.D., then its deployment must accelerate at the latest by the year 1990.

It has been estimated for the U.S.A. that if current investment trends in urban transport and housing continue *as presently planned* to the year of 2010, it would not be feasible to install known alternative energy systems—after that date—without completely rebuilding what will be essentially new utilities and services stocks.[11] (Because of replacement construction and the addition of new households, the 73 million units in place in 1975 will increase to an estimated 105 million in 2010, requiring 32 million new units plus 22 million replacement units of housing construction. Total new units in 2010 [54 millions] will exceed remaining units in place from 1975 [51 millions].) Essentially similar housing stock forecasts apply in Canada, but without the long-term perspective this opportunity for reshaping our urban energy future remains unexplored at the national policy level.

The Urban Transportation Development Corporation (UTDC) has analyzed several aspects of the relationships between transportation choice, urban energy and housing requirements, and economic and demographic growth. These relationships were quantified for the next fifteen-year planning period in Ontario urban regions as alternative development scenarios.

Most of the foreseeable increase in new household formation in Ontario will occur between now and 1995. This will induce major additions in urban housing stock, transportation utilities, energy supplies, and investment capital requirements for all of the foregoing. Between 1995 and 2010 little additional household formation will occur. After this time, there will be very little opportunity to change the urban design patterns.

The immediate growth period then is an opportunity to introduce new urban design better to meet the needs of the next fifteen to twenty-five years. A great deal of municipal planning is currently directed to this period of growth and it incorporates a strategy of urban development which shifts heavily towards transit investment and compact housing forms in response to capital cost, traffic congestion, and petroleum supply problems. However, the major transit facilities planned for Toronto, Ottawa, and Hamilton are proposed for implementation over the next twenty-five to thirty years. Further, the declining rate of household formation beyond 1990 dictates that *unless these facilities are constructed in a crash program within the next fifteen years* they will not have their maximum influence on city form and energy consumption savings. An accelerated investment in transit over the next fifteen years is necessary for the coordinated deployment of high quality transit systems and their associated high patronage residential developments to maximize energy savings, municipal development benefits, and the efficient use of Ontario's scarce investment capital.

UTDC concluded that this massive shift to public transit use in Ontario cities (from 20% to 45% mode split and from 15% to 30% load factor) was a physically and financially feasible option only *within the next fifteen years.*[12] But, it is an option inextricably tied to convergent municipal, provincial, federal, and private sector investment policies. The improvement in urban lifestyles (indicated by the planning models)—more choice in housing and type of neighborhood, better access to employment location, and a wider variety of urban amenities—can only be achieved by convergent public investment policies in energy, urban development, transportation, and housing services. The petroleum savings due to transit use in this energy conservation scenario are estimated to be more than sufficient to finance the front-end transit capital investment required—$4.7 billion over fifteen years.

THE GOALS ISSUE: How can multi-sector policy analysis be coordinated?

Long-range multi-sector policy research provides an understanding of *when* options for development coordination open or close; it provides the long-term perspective allowing capital budget resources to be matched to changing social needs over time; and it enables an understanding of *which* decisions impact options in related sectors.

However, there is a need for common simplified objectives to motivate the policies of governments and the projects of private enterprise towards desirable urban purposes. There has been a failure to articulate our urban goals and priorities at the national level. There is no special magic in articulating such goals for the future. In the absence of an elementary statement of purpose, or more grandly, of a 'whole systems' perspective, the policy options considered, evaluated, and recommended by individual program-oriented agencies and private corporations continue to be only partial measures at best. *When these policies are pushed to the management level for decision without a proper systemic base, management is forced to make decisions on an intuitive level.*

Two recent White Papers of the federal government on energy and the role of the automobile are a case in point. These comprehensive but uncoordinated issue papers on energy policy[13] and urban transportation[14] offer some insights into long-term issues but no linkages between policies, nor even evidence of an understanding of the many different objectives now being pursued that are clearly at odds with each other in the long-term.

There is no recognition that changes in energy *supply and utilization* may significantly change land use patterns and therefore change the role of public transit and urban automobiles. There is no long-range definition (even for policy development purposes) of the role of transit and the automobile in relation to energy and environmental quality goals. The articulation of meaningful economic development scenarios seriously lags behind the urban policy analysis task, when it should lead it.

The only practical way rationally to connect interrelated policies is by developing scenarios, which link and estimate the consequences of policy decisions in different sectors. Bringing scenarios to reality is the purpose of politics and political leadership. The challenging task for urban and economic planners is to produce well-articulated scenarios of the way Canada can develop in order to sustain the quality of life in low-energy consuming urban settlements. Even assessing the adequacy of current urban services investment plans against changing demographic conditions involves a major reiteration of energy policy studies under alternative long-range scenarios.[15]

THE METHODOLOGY ISSUE: Are appropriate long-term policy analysis techniques being applied?

The achievement of rationalized urban development objectives is dependent upon overcoming:

- ☐ severely conflicting capital resource requirements and limitations by ensuring the convergence of investments in alternative energy supplies, transportation and other utilities, and residential and commercial buildings and industrial plants;
- ☐ investment trends in long-life infrastructure and technology incompatible with low energy futures by defining and agreeing upon alternative and explicit guiding concepts for urban development; and
- ☐ the lack of optimism in our long-range public policy by recognizing that we still have a fundamental choice between the status quo and maintaining our high mobility lifestyle through future decades by changes in urban design.

The planning and policy methodology developed for rapid growth-rate conditions and short-term rate of return criteria is recognizably useless when applied to the time scale of several decades, and leads to substantial inter-generational inequities. The lifetime worth of urban facilities continues to be discounted at a rate which profits the present generation, with the result that present investment decisions continue to build in problems for the next generation rather than build in solutions.

By definition, strategic policy research deals with time-varying characteristics of population, economy, technology, and environment and their interaction. Analytical models which are used to estimate the total energy use and capital cost implications of alternatives in housing patterns, transport, and energy supply systems must include the adjustments in demographic and economic variables which are known to be applicable. *Choosing 1990 as an analysis year, for example, and then projecting 1990 results forward willy-nilly by twenty or fifty years as an assessment of long-term feasibility denies some very considerable realities concerning changes in population, energy price, capital availability, infrastructure replacement needs, and, not the least, economic growth rates. We need a moratorium on such cavalier policy treatment of the future.*

Summary

We have, in the remainder of this century, during two decades of continuous expansion of our stock of shelter, services, and industrial technology, to begin to provide new forms of urbanization which promise greater efficiency, continued economic stability, and maintenance of most of our fortunate North American lifestyle.

The OPEC energy-price signal has been our early warning to act while we still have that opportunity for transformation. If we forego this opportunity, it is likely that future generations will have to bear the burden of an urban stock grossly unsuited to available energy supplies and to the economic potentials of future labor and capital resources.

We need a heightened consciousness of the opportunity for change and the courage to apply long-term analytical and policy research to overcome seemingly intractable energy-dependence problems. If we continue to ignore the opportunities which we now have to redesign our use of urban space more efficiently and equitably than ever before, then we are taking the decision that future generations will be unnecessarily constrained to providing increasing accessibility in the city only by ever-increasing energy-intensive mobility.

NOTES

1 See, for example, Canada, Transport Canada, *The Future of the Automobile in Canada.* Ottawa: Canadian Government Publishing Centre, 1979; Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, *An Energy Strategy for Canada: Policies for Self-Reliance.* Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1976; and, U.S., Department of Transportation, *National Transportation Trends and Choices [To the Year 2000].* Washington: U.S.G.P.O., 1977.

2 Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, *Energy Futures for Canadians: Long-term Energy Assessment Program.* Report EP 78-1. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1978.

3 Science Council of Canada, *Implications of the Changing Age Structure of the Canadian Population: Sourcebook for a Working Party.* Study on Population and Technology. Ottawa: Science Council of Canada, Committee on Population and Technology, 1974.

4 *Op. cit.*

5 Some of these relations are dealt with in Ontario, Ministry of Energy, *Ontario's Energy Future.* Toronto: Ministry of Government Services, Printing Services Branch, 1977; Government of Québec, Ministry of Communications, Energy Division, *An Energy Policy for Québec: Insurance for the Future.* Quebec: Editeur officiel du Quebec, 1978; Canada, Energy, Mines and Resources, Energy Policy Sector, *Financing Energy Self-Reliance: A Background Paper to an Energy Strategy for Canada.* Report EP 77-8. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1977.

6 Urban Transportation Development Corporation, 'Moving into an Energy Efficient Society.' Submission to the Royal Commission Electric Power Planning. Toronto, 1976.

7 U.S., National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, 'Report of the Consumption, Location, and Occupational Patterns Group.' Draft Report to Energy Research and Development Administration, 1978.

8 Canadian Secretariat to the United Nations Seminar on the Impact of Energy Considerations on the Planning and Development of Human Settlements, *Habitat and Energy in Canada.* Ottawa: Ministry of State for Urban Affairs, 1977.

9 'U.S. Energy Demand: Some Low Energy Futures,' Demand and Conservation Panel of the Committee on Nuclear and Alternative Energy Systems, *Science,* vol. 200, 1978.

10 Kirk W. Foley, 'Urban Development in Canada: The Uncertain Way,' Background Paper for the National Planning Conference of the Community Planning Association of Canada, *Transit Journal* Spring 1978, pp. 31-40.

11 U.S., National Academy of Science, *op. cit.*

12 UTDC, *op. cit.*

13 Canada, Energy, Mines, and Resources, *op. cit.*

14 Canada, Transport Canada, *op. cit.*

15 David Brooks, *Economic Impact of Low Energy Growth in Canada: An Initial Analysis,* Discussion Paper no. 126. Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1978.

Resolving Development Decision-making, Ontario Style

D. Paul Emond

Today, as the speed increases with which values, aspirations, indeed societal goals change, society's ability to respond quickly to these changes is increasingly impaired. Doubt and uncertainty characterize the normal response to both new opportunities and crises. Not only have governments become cautious and reactive, they have become reactive in a negative sense—a sort of decision-making through inaction. Our elected decision-makers now express their doubt by having the same issue studied by two, three, and sometimes four appointed 'decision-makers.' Those who seek change seem justified in complaining that the growing hierarchy of government decision-makers and public participation procedures is crippling their, and their society's ability, to do anything.

Government's reaction is, in some respects, perfectly understandable. In one sense, it is nothing less than a conscious attempt better to appreciate and hence to anticipate the long-term consequences of any action. The mistakes of the past offer an almost irrefutable case for at least some planning, some independent assessment of the potential implications of a proposed course of action. Government's ambivalent response to issues is also very much determined by a recent realignment of power (a reassignment of rights) in which the public has received the right to participate in the decision-making process.[1] As the participation base has expanded to include more and more of the public, the likelihood of a consensus in favor of any particular course of action has virtually disappeared. Not that this is necessarily bad. In fact, it almost certainly reflects society's divergent views on the issue in question. It does, however, make positive action very difficult.

A good example of both the problem and new legislation to solve it comes from Ontario. Nowhere is the problem more clearly illustrated than in the context of nuclear energy development in general and Ontario Hydro's proposed Bruce to Milton high voltage (500kV) electric transmission line in particular. The first part of the Bruce nuclear generating station on Lake Huron was constructed some time ago, but the high voltage transmission line to take the power from Bruce to the Milton transformer station just west of Toronto, a distance of about 175 miles, is still not complete. The story of Hydro's attempts to get approval to construct the transmission line out of the Bruce station offers a compelling case for reforming regulatory decision-making in Ontario and indeed elsewhere in Canada. A brief examination of Ontario's new *Environmental Assessment Act, 1975* suggests a new mode of decision-making that responds fairly well to the problems of Bruce.

Briefly, the story begins in the late 1960s when Hydro (with the approval of Cabinet) decided to build a nuclear generating station on the Bruce Peninsula. That important decision went almost unnoticed by the public. Subsequent decisions have neither enjoyed the 'luxury' of public disinterest nor the environmental dangers implicit in such an approach to decision-making.

In 1971, Hydro, for engineering, demand, and 'security of supply' reasons, proposed to construct a line more or less straight south from Bruce to Milton, through Bradley and Georgetown, crossing one of Ontario's distinctive natural formations, the Niagara Escarpment, at Limehouse. A year later, Cabinet gave approval in principle to the proposed route. By 1972, opposition to the Bruce to Milton line was growing, particularly from the Independent Citizens' Group (I.C.G.), and that, combined with opposition from those along a connecting east-west transmission line (Nanticoke to Pickering to Lennoxville), persuaded the Government to conduct a public inquiry into the transmission line sitings under the chairmanship of Dr. O. Solandt. The I.C.G. appeared before the Solandt Commission inquiry and objected strongly to the Bruce to Milton route. First, it said that its members had not been consulted by Hydro prior to the 1971 decision, and secondly, it noted that the proposed route was environmentally unacceptable. The I.C.G. also argued that an alternative route (Bruce to Essa and then south to Toronto via the Kleinburg right-of-way) existed and should be fully explored before making a final decision on the preferred route. Solandt dismissed the I.C.G's argument by noting that it 'would not be easy to find a socially and environmentally acceptable route for the Bruce to Essa line,' and recommended in favor of the Bruce to Milton route. This recommendation was accepted by the Minister of Energy Darcy McKeough and subsequently by Hydro's own environmental study. The I.C.G. refused to accept either Solandt's recommendation or Hydro's allegedly self-serving environmental study. Opposition continued unabated throughout 1974.

As a 'final' concession to the opponents of the line, the new Minister of Energy James Taylor agreed to ask the Environmental Assessment Board (then known as the Environmental Hearing Board) to conduct public hearings, but to limit the scope of the hearings to the most contentious part of the proposed route, the Bradley to Georgetown segment. The I.C.G. objected to this limitation, but the Minister refused to expand the Board's terms of reference. The I.C.G. refused to accept such a limitation and presented its alternatives to the Board. The Board was frustrated. On the one hand it felt that 'it may be possible to find an environmentally acceptable route from the Bruce generating station to the Essa transformer station,' but its terms of reference precluded such a recommendation. In the end, the Board had little choice but to recommend in favor of Hydro's proposed route.

Following approval by the Solandt Commission and the Environmental Assessment Board (E.A.B.), Hydro next sought regulatory approval under *The Planning Act*. Planning approval is required in Ontario in those municipalities where the official plan and/or municipal zoning by-laws restrict the use of land, such as a restriction along the proposed route to non-electric utility purposes. The Town of Halton Hills, for example, a strong sympathizer of those opposed to the Hydro route, had passed such a restricted use zoning by-law in 1977. Hydro objected to the by-law at both the local council and the Ontario Municipal Board (O.M.B.) hearings, but to no avail. Although the by-law did not necessarily spell the demise of the line, it did mean that Hydro had to apply to the Halton Hills Council and the O.M.B. for an amendment to the zoning by-law to permit construction of the line. Hydro did this, but it meant another hearing before the local planning board and Council (fall of 1978), another hearing before the O.M.B. (January 1979), and another petition to Cabinet (May 1979).

While Hydro was skirmishing with Halton Hills over the local zoning by-laws, it was initiating proceedings in 1976 to expropriate lands along different parts of the route for the right-of-way. Here the I.C.G. and other opponents found another forum in which to express their opposition. Since *The Expropriations Act* was amended in 1969, an expropriated owner has the right to request a hearing of necessity before an inquiry officer under the *Act*. Although it is not clear what this hearing is supposed to accomplish, there was never any doubt in the minds of those owners along the Bruce to Milton route about what it was designed to do. They noted that the *Act* required the inquiry officer to recommend whether the taking of the land(s) was 'reasonably necessary to carry out the objectives of the expropriating authority (Hydro)' and, they concluded from this, that the inquiry officer must try to determine whether there are any more acceptable *alternative* routes. In other words, the owners argued that the officer must hear evidence about the suitability of the Bruce to Essa route. In light of the earlier hearings, the inquiry officer refused to hear such evidence and the owners sought judicial review of the officer's decision. In the first case, the Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the owners' interpretation and sent the case back to the inquiry officer to hear evidence with regard to alternatives. At this point, however, Hydro refused to put any information before the inquiry on alternatives and the only witness it produced was an engineer who was not competent to speak about alternatives. The owners, of course, could not 'prove' the desirability of their alternative without at least access to Hydro's data and Hydro's lack of cooperation ultimately spelled the demise of the owners' case.

The I.C.G.'s early success at the Court of Appeal was short-lived. Six months after the first case, the Ontario Divisional Court decided that the hearing of necessity should be restricted in the way suggested by Hydro. 'Alternative routes' were not, according to the Court, a proper subject matter for an inquiry hearing. While it may be hard for the owners to understand how the Court of Appeal and Divisional Court can arrive at opposite results on othe same point and, indeed, on the same facts, it is not any easier for lawyers to understand.

Parts of the Bruce to Milton line are still not built. Hydro has finally received the go-ahead on the Halton Hills segment of the line and is expropriating the last parcels of land for the right-of-way. One would expect that the line will be constructed and carrying power by 1980, but who knows. The I.C.G. remains unalterably opposed to it until an independent evaluation of the Essa alternative is carried out and used to form the basis of a final decision. In fact, the only independent study of the two routes (a very cursory review of the alternatives using Hydro data by Slater Consultants in December 1977) concluded that I.C.G.'s Essa route was preferable to Hydro's! How could Hydro be so 'wrong' for so long? How could the regulatory process take so long and still produce such an unacceptable decision to 'approve' a proposal?

The answer may lie in the Environmental Assessment Board's 1975 comment that there seems to be a *basic flaw in the public participation process.* Indeed, there seems to be a basic flaw in the decision-making process. The same comment, incidentally, could be made about the Pickering airport, the Darlington nuclear generating station, or indeed the decision-making process for almost any major development decision of the past ten years. The way we make decisions or indeed *do not* make decisions is in need of substantial overhaul.

It is a little unfair to blame Hydro for the litany of horrors along the Bruce to Milton line. They were doing things (making decisions) pretty much the way they had always made decisions. In fact they had, to some extent, changed their earlier procedures to accommodate public input. Unfortunately for Hydro, times have changed more than they have appreciated. Society is no longer sure that what it now needs is more of what it has always wanted. We are in an era of uncertainty. There is seldom ever overall agreement on anything and often not even a majority on difficult issues. To return to an earlier theme in this essay, as the need to respond to opportunities and crises increases, society seems determined to ensure that decision-making grinds to a halt. We do not even muddle through anymore. Some are unsure where we should be muddling to. Those who are sure, find that muddling has become such an expensive, time-consuming process that it virtually precludes doing anything as long as even a single person is opposed.

The Ontario Legislature has institutionalized dissent to such an extent that there are now a multiplicity of forums in which those opposed to a project may participate. Again, to use the Bruce to Milton transmission line example, the proposal from Hydro put in motion literally dozens of hearings — many covering exactly the same ground. They ranged all the way from hearings at the municipal level (planning boards and municipal councils) provincial (E.A.B., O.M.B., expropriation hearings as well as specialized bodies such as the Niagara Escarpment Commission and Ontario Energy Board). If federal funding and power experts had been involved, hearings at the federal level (environmental assessment review and the National Energy Board). Little wonder that small developers throw their hands up in despair and complain that only the big corporations can afford to gamble on a favorable result from such an extravagant process. Little wonder that our biggest land development companies now find the climate in the U.S. more hospitable. Who could blame Hydro for having apoplexy over the specter of *repeating* three years of Porter Commission inquiries into electric power planning, and almost two years of Select Legislative Committee hearings into nuclear power, when Hydro submits its next nuclear generating proposal for review by the Environmental Assessment Board?

There are two problems that urgently need our attention. The first is how to formalize and regularize public participation in the decision-making process. The second is how best to cut away the cumbersome and obsolete overlap that exists within the existing regulatory regime. Both the problems and the solutions are closely related and thus must be addressed together.

Before suggesting a solution to these problems, let me note briefly what we should *not* do. First, we should generally not seek ways to curtail public involvement in the decision-making process. As attractive as this reactive response may appear to be, it is ultimately counter-productive. Whether Hydro, or indeed any other public or private developer likes it, dissent is valid and must be given an effective voice. In fact, to deny it a voice is to recreate another Bruce to Milton nightmare. Public participation was not an issue ten or fifteen years ago. Society then had a shared sense of purpose and Hydro really did speak for all of us. The issues in the fifties and sixties were not whether we *should* build another electrical generating station or power transmission line, or even *where* to build it, but rather *how* to build it, and *how* to finance it. In those days, the public unanimously supported the 'should' and was happy to defer to the 'experts' from Hydro on the 'where' and 'how.' Today, however, uncertainty is the order of the day— uncertainty about the technology, particularly new technologies such as the nuclear technology behind Three Mile Island; uncertainty about whether the benefits of a project outweigh the *real* costs it may impose on the social, economic, and natural environment; and uncertainty about whether the new 'technical' values are better than the old values.

Many now recognize that there is no right answer to whether we *should* build nuclear generating stations and high voltage transmission lines or indeed whether we should do anything else. Questions of 'should' generally relate to values and I would be reluctant to argue that one value was better than another in the context of such issues. Society, it seems to me, has quite clearly decided that these questions should not be answered by the developer on the basis of a rather crass economic determination of supply and demand. Beyond that, few people are confident about the right course of action. The principle that developers must pay for the real costs of development is widely accepted. But while the environment (broadly defined) must be protected and costs internalized, many agree that if environmental protection means fossilizing the existing social structure, then they feel that enthusiasm for pristine pure rivers and the social status quo should be tempered with more compassion for the unemployed poor.

Given a general divergence of values today, the best that can be said about decision-making is that the decision-maker should hear both sides; indeed, hear from *everyone* before deciding. This is not to suggest that we should postpone deciding everything indefinitely, only that we should adopt a process that gives those who do not share the pro-development or indeed the pro-environment view, an *equal* opportunity to participate in the decision. In fact, were one determined to put off deciding issues indefinitely, it would be hard to find a better way of guaranteeing inaction than to embrace the present process of *private* decision-making followed, as it often is, by largely unsuccessful efforts to convince the public of the correctness of the decision. We must, if we are to respond to opportunities, develop a decision-making process that encompasses all points of view and provides a workable mechanism for reconciling differences.

Second, we should be very skeptical of any solution that does little more than tinker with the existing morass of regulatory regimes. Overlap and duplication of functions presently abound among existing boards and is clearly a problem; however, the solution is not more 'fine tuning.' Proposals for parallel hearings (the O.M.B. and the E.A.B., for example, would hear an application for a new development project simultaneously rather than sequentially), joint boards (members of the O.M.B. and the E.A.B. would sit on a joint panel and the decision of the panel would be the decision of both boards), or having one board hear and determine certain matters (such as need) and another the balance of the issues (siting, technical detail) are not well conceived. The first does not eliminate overlap, it merely speeds it up. In addition, the possibility of having to resolve inconsistent decisions by the parallel boards remains. The second promises to be a legal nightmare as the losing party seeks judicial review on a regular basis in an effort to determine which of the two board procedures is to predominate. The third suggestion may solve some of the overlap, but both boards will be hampered by the split jurisdiction and their inability to get a full overview of all the issues.

Finally, it would be a serious mistake to abolish all the existing structures and start again. Ontario's provincial boards and tribunals like those in other provinces, have acquired a good deal of expertise in procedure, public participation, and substantive decision-making. Also, they have developed a reasonably good rapport with their constituents — both those seeking approval and those opposing it. To abolish, for example, the O.M.B. and the E.A.B. and start again with a super board that would eliminate the overlap strikes me as both an extravagant and naive approach to the problems.

In my opinion, we are unlikely to come up with a more comprehensive, systematic approach to decision-making than the one set out in *The Environmental Assessment Act, 1975.* The procedure is sound and, once the Cabinet recognizes the potential role for the Environmental Assessment Board and appoints members on the basis of ability rather than political affiliation, Board decision-making will improve. If these comments about the Board are accurate, the answer to the questions of how we should make decisions (and by whom), and how we can best minimize the overlap seems clear. Give major development decisions to the E.A.B. and eliminate the overlap by eliminating or minimizing the role of competing boards and tribunals.

The case for a greater E.A.B. role in decision-making is not difficult to make. First, looking back to the Bruce to Milton transmission line, the E.A.B. (which examined only part of the case pursuant to an order-in-council), was the only body to appreciate the problems raised by Hydro's insistence on a pre-determined route. It recognized also the need to involve the public in meaningful participation — participation that included members of the public in the planning process rather than merely using them as a sounding board for Hydro policy. Since that case, the powers of the Board have been considerably broadened and expanded by *The Environmental Assessment Act.*

The Environmental Assessment Act is the only *Act* in Ontario, and indeed in Canada, that addresses the crises in decision-making described above.[2] In fact, environmental assessment is a misnomer. It would be better named 'The Decision-Making Act.' It requires the proponent of an undertaking to conduct an environmental (broadly defined to include social and economic conditions as well as the natural environment) assessment, including a full discussion of both alternative technologies and alternatives to the undertaking itself. In other words, it puts the onus on the proponent to show that his project is environmentally sound.

It requires the provincial government to evaluate the assessment through a government review coordinated by the Ministry of the Environment. Finally, it invites the public to respond to the assessment and review documents. If any member of the public is dissatisfied by either the quality of the analysis or indeed with the assumptions underlying the proposed undertaking, he/she may request the Board to conduct a hearing into the proposal. At the hearing, virtually all interested persons are 'parties' and thus all may participate fully in the process. After hearing the evidence, the Board may approve the proposed undertaking, approve it subject to terms and conditions, or not approve it. After that, the Cabinet has twenty-eight days in which to substitute its decision for that of the Board. If the Cabinet does not act within the period, the decision of the Board is final.

The comprehensiveness of the assessment, the potential for broadly based public participation, and the prospect of decision-making by a potentially representative, increasingly expert board, all combine to make a compelling case for giving the E.A.B. primary jurisdiction over large, contentious projects. The Board's jurisdiction is broad enough to include many of those matters now examined by the O.M.B., special commissions (such as those chaired by Solandt, Porter, and Fahlgren), the Ontario Energy Board, and the expropriation inquiry officer (hearing of necessity).

The questions of how to resolve the overlap and indeed how to improve decision-making generally are under review by the Ministry of Housing (the White Paper on *The Planning Act*), the Fahlgren and Porter Commissions (public participation and decision-making segment of their hearings into the Northern Ontario Environment and Hydro Electric Power Planning respectively), and the Attorney General's office (*The Expropriations Act* review). In my opinion, they need not look any farther than *The Environmental Assessment Act.* This *Act* responds to the problems addressed in this essay in a way that no other legislation in Ontario, or for that matter, anywhere else in Canada, does. The *Act's* potential has been recognized in an agreement between the Ministers of Housing and Environment to use it exclusively for proposals that would normally be subject to both O.M.B. and E.A.B. review. What we need now is Cabinet's resolve to make the environmental assessment process work. That means giving the Ministry of the Environment and the E.A.B. the resources to do the job, and then putting all major proposals that may significantly affect the social, economic, and natural environment under the *Act.* It also means, and this point cannot be emphasized too strongly, appointing full-time members to the Board who are both sensitive to today's decision-making dilemma and representative of different societal interests.

The Environmental Assessment Act offers more than a last ditch effort to *improve* decision-making; it offers a way to *start* making decisions again.

NOTES

1 D. Paul Emond, 'Participation and the Environment: A Strategy for Democratizing Canada's Environmental Protection Laws,' *Osgoode Hall Law Journal,* vol. 13, 1975, p. 783.

2 D. Paul Emond, *Environmental Assessment Law in Canada.* Toronto: Emond-Montgomery Ltd., 1978.

ARTICLES

Instant Resource Towns Policy in British Columbia: 1965-1972

John H. Bradbury

High labor turnover, community instability, male dominance, and isolation have traditionally been features of many Canadian resource towns. In the past, company towns in which the company owned not only the mine or the mill, but also the local store and the housing, were the usual forms of settlement associated with resource extraction in frontier areas. Some companies provided pleasant housing and reasonable rents for the workforce, others created virtual shack-towns or conglomerates of bunkhouses.

During the 1950s and 1960s, companies, governments, and planners in Canada were increasingly interested in reshaping such settlements. The planning profession, drawing on current planning research, was hopeful that changes in the layout and structure of towns could improve social relations. Companies and governments hoped that new settlement forms would attract a more stable workforce—men and their families—and thus mitigate the old problems of high labor turnover and male dominance. Companies also hoped to relieve themselves of the troublesome role of landlord and storekeeper. The firms involved in resource extraction were increasingly multinationals with their head offices in far off metropolises. For them, the day to day running of a town was more trouble than it was worth. If people owned their own houses, and ran their own settlements, not only would the companies be released from administration problems, but they would also be relieved of the associated costs. For governments, in an age that stressed democracy at all levels, the granting of municipal status to what had been the company's domain appeared a popular move.

The *Instant Towns Act*, passed in the British Columbia Legislature in 1965, reflects these changed ideas among planners, governments, and company officials.[1] This article will examine the aims and content of that legislation, its relationship to planning ideas in Canada, and to the needs of the companies involved. It will focus on the problems of turnover, demographic imbalance and isolation, and show that the changes in settlement form had little effect in modifying those features of resource town life. That the legislation appears to have been unsuccessful in the short term is not surprising. It failed to address the one vital feature of such towns—that of their dominance by one company whose raison d'être is resource extraction. If the resource is depleted, no longer profitable to produce, or available cheaper elsewhere, the company may choose to leave. This basic cause and source of instability could not be addressed by the legislation. Indeed the stress of homeownership merely meant that if a company did withdraw, the homeowners, and not the company, generally shouldered the burden of useless real estate.[2]

The first section will examine the background to the new resource towns policy in British Columbia, and the second, the nature of that policy in the context of planning in other parts of Canada. A third section will examine the implementation of the policy by government and planners in the 1960s in British Columbia, while a final section assesses its success, showing that labor turnover, demographic structures, and isolation still continue. While much of the article deals generally with all British Columbia instant towns, Port Alice on northern Vancouver Island is used as an example to examine specifically the implementation of the instant town legislation.

The work of Robinson and Lucas provides us with the start of an analytical framework to discuss the background of the instant towns policy in British Columbia. Robinson points out that high labor turnover and a sense of impermanence appear to be a common characteristic of many resource based towns; social stratification in these settlements tends to be reflected in the location of different groups in a community; and the economic base of most communities is limited by one resource extraction or processing company.[3] The companies themselves tend to be paternalistic despite recent attempts to avoid such situations. The very nature of the non-renewable resource in mining areas and the variations in commodity prices means that instability is built into the base of each settlement. Forestry towns are very similar to mining towns but they have a possibility of being attached to a longer term or renewable resource base. Changes in the administrative structure of such towns (vis-à-vis the British Columbia *Instant Towns Act*) have done little to alleviate these basic constraints. Local government tends to become the servant of the resource company despite the election of town councils which are often

Map 1

Selected instant towns and other urban centers, British Columbia, 1972



dominated by the company, and even if not, they are very dependent on the company for a livelihood and a tax base.

Lucas argues that resource towns are likely to pass through four stages or cycles in their development—construction, recruitment, transition, and maturity.[4] While it is apparent that all these phases may occur in a resource town it is not always clear that a settlement and community will necessarily grow through all the stages. Those communities in the mature stage, for instance, are generally those which have survived on a long term resource base or a locally diversified economy. Many settlements on the Canadian resource frontier have either been stayed at the transition stage or abandoned prior to reaching it. Lucas indicates quite clearly that there are social and economic conditions characteristic of each of his stages which are similar to those experienced in British Columbia's instant towns—especially in the construction and youthful stages of development. Many resource towns stay at this first or second stage of Lucas' model and, in terms of their age structures, sex ratios, and labor turnover rates, do not advance to the final stages of maturity.

The instant towns legislation represents an attempt by government and by companies to precipitate the movement of communities from a youthful or transition stage into a maturity stage. What follows here is an analysis of some of the difficulties experienced in attempting this process in British Columbia in the 1960s.

Instant Towns: Background to Planning Policy[5]

Between 1965 and 1972, nine instant towns were developed for the mining and wood pulp industries in isolated areas of British Columbia (see Map 1).[6] Of this total number, six were new settlements, and three were based on existing communities (see Table 1). While the building of new towns close to resource extraction sites was not unusual in the history of resource use in British Columbia, the settlements created in the 1960s were noteworthy in terms of the number of towns developed, the multinational nature of the firms which took part and the fact that the towns represented a deliberate attempt to bring about social and structural change. The growth of the new settlements was largely due to the penetration of the British Columbia resource frontier by the multinational firms noted in Table 1. The overall process of penetration and integration was part of what Hone called, on a global scale, the primary commodities boom of the 1960s.[7] Demand for primary commodities jumped in that decade, giving rise to the expansion of resource extraction not only in British Columbia but in other regions of Canada, internationally, and especially in the Third World. This expansion was accompanied by a growth in size and rate of extraction by multinational firms as witnessed by their actions in British Columbia. The appearance on the landscape of the new instant towns was thus a response to increased rates of extraction of resources by large firms in British Columbia. The legislation and policies of the provincial government were an attempt to provide infrastructure and to exercise control over the growth and location of all new resource-based settlements.

Under the instant town legislation, the granting of local government and the enfranchisement of the workforce generally served to change the focus of the costs of developing housing and physical infrastructure from the companies to the town residents. The responsibility of running the town was transferred to the local government, but the companies, whether or not they desired it, still maintained a form of control over the growth, viability, and longevity of the communities by virtue of their control over housing stocks, development land, their influence on municipal councils, and their hold over the major source of capital and the source of income of the workforce. The raison d'être of the instant towns was thus little different to that of older company towns in the province. Labor turnover in instant towns remained generally high and demographic profiles and age structures showed little of the expected effect of the new environ-

Table 1:
International corporate linkages and the British Columbia hinterland instant towns developed in the 1960s

Instant Town in B.C.	Staple Produced	B.C. Company	International Owners % Ownership	Location of Parent Firm
Port Alice*	Pulp and Paper	Rayonier (Canada) Ltd.	ITT 100%	United States
Gold River	Pulp	Tahsis Ltd.	Canadian Int. Paper Ltd. 50% East Asiatic Corporation 50%	United States Denmark
Mackenzie	Pulp and Paper	B.C. Forest Products Ltd.	Noranda Mines 28.5% Mead Corp. 15.3% Brunswick Ltd. 26.6% Argus Corp. 13.4%	Canada United States United States Canada
Fraser Lake*	Molybdenum	Endako Mines Ltd.	Noranda Mines 26.5%	Canada
Granisle	Copper	Granisle Copper Ltd.	Zapata Corp. 100%	United States
Granisle	Copper	Bell Copper Ltd.	Noranda Mines 26.5%	Canada
Logan Lake	Copper and Molybdenum	Lornex Mines Ltd.	Rio Algom 59%	Great Britain
Elkford	Coal	Cominco	Canada Pacific Invest. Ltd. 54%	Canada
Sparwood	Coal	Kaiser Resources Ltd.	Kaiser Corp. 79.2%	United States
Port Hardy*	Copper	Utah Mines Ltd.	Utah Mines Ltd. 100%	United States

*Existing settlement prior to creation of instant town status.

Sources: Data from Financial Post *Directory of Ownership*. McLean Hunter, Toronto, 1972: Financial Post *Corporation Service Files;* Submissions to the *Pierse Commission*, Royal Commission on Forestry in British Columbia, Vancouver and Victoria, B.C., 1975; Dunn and Bradstreet, *Canadian Key Business Directory*, Toronto, 1975; *Moody's Investor Service Inc.* New York, vols. 1 and 2; P. Marchak, 'Class Regional, and Institutional Sources of Social Conflict in British Columbia,' *B.C. Studies*, no. 27, Autumn 1975, pp. 30-49; P. Marchak, *In Whose Interests: An Essay on Multinational Corporations in a Canadian Context.* Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979.

ments. Indeed, the notion of physical planning and design acting as a cure of the social ills of resource towns was advanced for pragmatic reasons as well as for any likely benefit of the new physical environments for town residents. Moreover the essence of the instant town legislation probably served to benefit the resource companies in the long run. At the time of the legislation, for instance, resource companies were receiving complaints from the government about shack-town conditions in resource frontier areas—new towns and urban relocations were an easy solution to these situations. The companies were also able to pass on the costs of all construction within the new settlements: the provincial level of government and the citizens of the new towns were obliged to assume both the costs and the responsibilities for running the settlements.

Planning of Resource Towns: the Canadian Context

The objective of town planning in Canadian resource towns (from 1916, when Timiskaming, the first planned mining town, was built) has been to create suitably attractive urban environments in isolated areas so that an adequate workforce could be housed and maintained adjacent to a resource extraction site.[8] The literature describing this objective contains planning models which imply that given the maximum advantage of a planned community, the problems of isolated resource towns, if not overcome entirely, would at least be alleviated. In 1953, Walker, for instance, suggested that the emphasis given to planning in Canadian resource towns was based on a substantial articulate opinion throughout Canada in favor of planning.[9] He also outlined two major reasons why resource extraction companies in particular favored town planning in frontier areas of the hinterland. The first related to the awareness among large corporations of the public relations value of having their industrial operations carried on in a showplace community that favorably impressed customers and visitors. Second, he observed that in order to draw prospective employees from southern areas of Canada, the companies considered that an attractive physical environment in a planned model town should be offered, as living in a well planned company town site would make the employee a happy resident whose contentedness would be reflected in a similar attitude towards his work and his employer.

As long ago as 1917, the work of Thomas Adams in resource towns in Québec and Ontario shows there existed a planning policy aimed at improving conditions in frontier areas.[10] The work of Adams, and others who followed, shows that a strong thread of ideas has promoted the notion that solutions to frontier community isolation and resource town problems could be couched in urban planning terms. To create a better life for workers, it was argued, a better physical environment had to be provided. Brody, Henderson, Lucas, Mathiasson, Parker, Robinson, and Siemens are among many who have argued along similar lines.[11]

Implementation of Planning Policy in British Columbia in the 1960s

In British Columbia the instant towns were build with the notion of permanence and improvement of facilities and services in mind. Town planning firms were employed by the companies to locate the sites of new towns and to prepare physical layout plans for each new site. The corporations were willing to accept the planning ideas both to improve their image and to promote stable communities. The provincial government pointed to the new towns as evidence of a policy in action.

An understanding of the role of the provincial Department of Municipal Affairs is important to understanding the planning process in the instant towns in British Columbia. The Minister between 1962 and 1972, Hon. Dan Campbell, required that all new towns constructed during his period of office should bear the stamp of the planner and architect. At the same time, Campbell was concerned with fulfilling the general expansionist policies of the provincial government. The replacement of company towns with new towns was part of this process. He suggested that the artifacts of companies were as much a symbol of corporate control as the institutions themselves.[12] Hence, the socio-physical artifacts which symbolized company towns—the company store, company houses, and company hospitals—had to be replaced with new symbols which could not be readily identified with a corporate image or with corporate control. In Port Alice (on northern Vancouver Island), for instance, an old company town was destroyed and replaced with a new instant town. The object was not only to remove a company town and replace its institutions, but also to replace a recognizable corporation landscape. The company store was replaced with a new town center incorporating a variety of services—shopping center, supermarket, hotel, post office, and variety stores. Company housing, the hospital, and the old

Plate 1

Logan Lake: an instant town constructed for the Lornex Mining Corporation in central British Columbia



Gold River: an instant town built for the Tahsis Company (pulp and paper) on the west coast of Vancouver Island community center, were in turn replaced by privately owned houses and rental accommodation, a government sponsored center, and a municipal hall and community sports arena. The row housing of a previous era was replaced with neighborhood designs and curvilinear streets— suburbia of the south was translated into isolated northern living for southern workers (see Plate 1). However, settlements like Port Alice, and most other instant towns, did not become multi-purpose in the sense of serving more than one community or industry; rather the service sector was simply opened up to any firms which might wish to locate there.

The provincial Department of Municipal Affairs, in accordance with the government's overall development policy, exercised stringent controls over the growth, shape, and development of the resource town planning through a system of community planning regulations.[13] The community plans prescribed a precise physical relationship of instant towns to the industrial sites; all new settlements were required to be separate from the mine or mill. Instead of being clustered around the pithead or mill, the government regulations stipulated that each new settlement should be given its own identity with a specific town center. This process did, of course, remove some of the unsightliness of older company towns. In the process of locating townsites at some distance from the work place, new towns were sometimes denied the tax base from industries. This was modified in some cases by extending a boundary line from the town to the mill to ensure that the industrial site came under the taxation area of the townsite. Even so, certain companies were given tax concessions under these arrangements. For instance, British Columbia Forest Products at MacKenzie (an instant town) was required to pay taxes at a rate not to exceed one-fifth of the maximum otherwise permissible under the *Municipal Act.*[14]

The planners of the instant towns also endeavored to create settlements with the motor car in mind, which in itself was a tacit recognition of suburban trends, and an attempt to instill a higher level of mobility in settlements where workers in some instances could no longer walk from home to workplace. It also was an admission of a lack of any other imaginative way of designing towns for unique northern and isolated environments. In a similar manner, shopping center concepts and street designs were imported directly from the south. The shopping center and the parking lot became the meeting place for residents. The adoption of such models had also been apparent in the earlier planning of Kitimat in northern British Columbia, and Thompson in Manitoba.

Town plans were prepared by professional planning firms under contract to resource based companies. Special attention was given to the articulation of the physical design, shape, and housing of each settlement (see Appendix). The objectives of the planners were carefully defined in contractual agreements with the companies. One company instructed its planner to project an image of the company in which a sense of permanence and the importance of the company's status would be portrayed.[15] Another company, Endako Mines at Fraser Lake, instructed its planner to create an 'independent community' even though most of the homeowners were employed by Endako. In addition the planner was (somehow) to avoid all the traditional problems of a company town. In the same town, it was argued by the company that dissatisfied workers with a bent for industrial strife could be changed into middle class property owners content to become permanently established householders who would tend to avoid involvement in strikes;[16] a policy not unlike that adopted in planning the 19th century town for the Pullman Company in the United States, as noted by Harvey.[17]

In instant towns, resource companies continued to exercise a degree of control over housing despite the policies of homeownership and the enfranchisement of the workforce. In the first place, the companies or subsidiary contractors built the housing stock for sale or rental. Workers could purchase homes directly from the company but, if and when employment ceased, the terms of the contract required resale to the company under a buy-back clause at a predetermined rate. By such means, the company was able to retain a degree of control over housing stock for a minimum of five years, in a manner not unlike the older company towns. There were several repercussions to such policies and the problem of homeownership in the instant towns. Residents in Port Alice, for example, expressed doubt about the viability of the economy of a single industry town in terms of the maintenance of their equity. Similarly, residents in Mackenzie expressed concern about the degree of control exercised by a company which could remove people from housing once employment with the company had ceased. Paradoxically, companies which desired a more permanent labor force, through commitment by residents to purchase a house, did not always measure up to long term commitment to maintaining a plant or mine or mill in operation for an equivalent length of time, e.g., ITT at Port Cartier in Québec, Crown Zellerbach at Ocean Falls in British Columbia.

Community plans and letters patent for each settlement were used as a means for controlling initial development as well as governance of each settlement. The letters patent for an instant town contained regulations regarding the methods of election of interim municipal councillors for the first five years. Any owner of land could be elected to the first municipal council, but since only company officials were present, the tendency was for the company to control directly the first five years of each settlement's existence. After the initial phase, company officials and company policy tended to dominate town council policies by both direct and indirect means.[18] In the instant town of Mackenzie full municipal status was not granted until after six and one-half years had passed (instead of the statutory five years), during which time the council was dominated first by company executives and later by a combination of four company officials and three union officials. The Letters Patent for Mackenzie also outlined exceptions to the *Municipal Act* of British Columbia. One provided for control by government agencies and gave relief from certain taxation to the resource company.[19] Another, Section 18 of the Letters Patent, provided release from Section 249 of the *Municipal Act,* thus permitting the aggregate debt of the new town to exceed the 20% of the total assessed value of the townsite normally applied under the *Act.* In Mackenzie and in other instant towns, this resulted in a higher than average per capita debt. The average per capita debenture debt for all instant towns in 1970 was $542.53 whereas the debt for all others was $261.91, a difference of $280.62 or 107%.[20]

The official Letters Patent granted to Port Alice in 1965 also reflected the provincial government's attempts to ensure a carefully formulated growth pattern for each new settlement. Subsection 16 of the town's Letters stated, for instance, that the municipal council did not have the power to act contrary to the by-laws and regulations provided by the Department of Municipal Affairs, whereas other non-instant towns were permitted to do so. Control over the towns was exercised through strict regulations which were laid down for such items as the position of fences, the color of houses, the location of clotheslines and other household facilities, and the type and quality of the roof of each building. Citizens were prohibited from making an individual expression on the physical structures of housing within the townsite. Similar regulations were noted in Mackenzie and other instant towns where restrictions were placed on the location of garden lots and on fence types and locations. Citizens came to regard these controls as an extension of corporate and governmental influence in the new settlements.[21]

The instant towns, like many other northern towns, tend to appear mundane; they look like any neat and trim suburb found in a metropolitan area. Indeed they appear to be out of context with their surrounding landscape. Their physical format suggests a larger urban milieu with more cultural amenities than are actually present. Thus the planners, in trying to duplicate suburbia, have raised expectations which, because of the very nature and isolated locations of many instant towns, cannot be fulfilled. Moreover, the combination of isolation and the close juxtaposition of town and forest or wilderness, rather than town to city, reveals an incongruity which for some residents is a source of stress and concern.[22]

The Context of Social and Economic Conditions in Instant Towns

Instant towns like their predecessors, the company towns, are characterized by a high labor turnover with its associated community and industrial costs: distorted demographic structures; personal and physical isolation; and the instability and impermanence of all resource based towns.

Part of the reason for the perpetuation of social and economic problems may be ascertained from an understanding of the political economy of resource town development. British Columbia's resource towns are dominated by metropolitan centers. The demands of the metropolis define the nature of the hinterland. Social problems so often cited as characteristics of frontier resource towns, including high turnover, unbalanced age structure, and sex ratios, to a degree, result from the requirements of the metropolitan economy for supplies of raw materials and for places to invest.[23] Indeed, as Castells has suggested, the economic level of operations (in the resource hinterland) influences the social structure of those communities:

> Among the factors which structure social relations and forms of collective life two large elements show up in the foreground of capitalist industrial societies: these are 'the big corporations,' the economic organizations of production and management which correspond to the concentration of capital and of the means of production, and the 'State Apparatus,' which increasingly intervenes in the whole of economic and social life and becomes thereby, a developer of daily life.[24]

The change from company town to instant town, which reflected the move to increasing multinational ownership, led to modifications in the social structure of such communities. Gone is the old-time boss; in his place is found a new managerial class and local bourgeoisie. With the relinquishment of company control over local consumer outlets came the growth of a small petty bourgeois class and a group of service workers.[25] The towns now have local government, albeit still dominated by managers and workers from the local industry. Other factors seem to have changed very little. The instant towns are if anything, more dependent on decisions made at some distant metropolis. As well, they must still be close to the resources. High levels of labor turnover, demographic distortions, and effects of isolation and impermanence, continue despite the changes in legal status.

Labor Turnover

Remote industrial locations on Canada's resource frontier have traditionally experienced high levels of labor turnover. This particular problem was one which both the resource companies and the provincial government in British Columbia had hoped to overcome in the instant towns of the 1960s. In most circumstances, high labor turnover is very expensive for the resource companies, hence it is in their interest to attempt to curb it; and as we will see later it is also disruptive for communities and expensive for families and for individual workers. A Manitoba study in 1974 concluded for instance that:

> . . . average estimated cost associated with separation of one hourly paid employee was $102 for a non-metal mine and $646 for a metal mine. For salaried employees, separation costs for a non-metal mine ($248) were ⅓ that of separation from a metal mine ($665). The average cost of separations (both hourly and salaried) for both types of mines was $584 with separations of salaried workers having an average cost of about $71 higher than that associated with the separation of an hourly paid worker.[26]

The companies wanted to attract families and a more permanent workforce. The promotional literature given to applicants in Vancouver before workers and their families departed for the townsites generally stressed the urban amenities of the towns, the family atmosphere, and the newly planned physical layout and environments of the townsites.[27] Instant towns occasionally became peopled by a higher proportion of urbanites than was the experience in older resource towns.

Labor turnover in the instant towns remained high throughout the 1960s, with, in some cases, slight declines in the early 1970s. Table 2 shows details of turnover rates for several of the instant towns. Turnover rates as high as 198% in one year were experienced, suggesting that the communities were unstable and fluctuating. Even the oldest of the new towns in British Columbia experienced high turnover rates: Kitimat, for instance, a new settlement built for Alcan in 1952, experienced a turnover of 62% in 1973. Port Alice, originally established as a company town in 1918, had a 45% turnover rate in 1970 and 1971.

Labor turnover in an instant town has implications beyond expense to the company for training and retraining. When persons quit work, they leave town as well, taking their family with them. Thus labor turnover equals community turnover. When this is borne in mind, the relatively low 45% annual turnover at the Port Alice mill seems high in terms of the establishment of community stability.[28] Similarly, a worker in an instant, or any isolated, resource town, may leave work not only because he/she dislikes the job, but also because a worker or a spouse dislikes the community. According to past thinking, conditions in the industry were the main reason for high turnover, but if a family does not find a town an acceptable place to live, it does not matter whether the male head of household likes his job because: '. . . unhappiness in the employee family is by far the greatest cause of employee transience.'[29]

The answer to why high turnover continues can be dealt with at two levels. Firstly, the reasons that people themselves give for leaving work and, secondly, structural reasons within the economy of resource extraction. Studies conducted in Kitimat[30] and in Port Alice in British Columbia, give some indications of the reasons workers give on leaving work, although these may not always represent the whole truth. At Kitimat, where the Alcan Company incurred annual turnover costs in excess of $2 million in 1973, job related factors and conditions were cited as major causes by 40.7% of those quitting. The noxious or the heavy physical aspects of work common to heavy industry were the key factors cited. (In the Alcan plant, for instance, air temperatures reached 140°F in summer peak periods.) Other reasons given for quitting were 'dissatisfaction with the community' (8.9%). Reasons for termination given by Port Alice workers suggest a different pattern, although the two data sets are difficult to compare. The Port Alice data were derived

Table 2:
Annual labor turnover in new instant towns in British Columbia

Town	1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973
				*Percent Employees Leaving**				
Port Alice	92	65	55	55	45	45	—	—
Mackenzie	—	—	—	—	—	92	102	90
Granisle*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	198
Granisle**	—	—	—	—	33a	42a	71	103
Logan Lake	—	—	—	—	—	90	84	87
Gold River	—	—	—	—	—	—	180	198
Tahsis	190	125	100	100	111	132	133	157
Elkford	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	77
(Kitimat)	—	38	—	34	34	16	31	62

* a=Company estimates, records not accurately or properly kept.

Source: Information collected from resource companies in survey by the author in 1974: Rayonier Canada (B.C.) Ltd., B.C. Forest Products Ltd., *Bell Copper Ltd., **Granisle Copper Ltd., Cominco (Fording Coal division), and Alcan.

from an examination of 'terminated' mill files showing details of workers who had left the job between 1960 and July 1973. Although these records were not fully accurate and the reasons for quitting were not necessarily the correct ones, the data do give an example of turnover reasons in one instant town.[31]

The availability of an 'alternate job' depends on the numbers of jobs available elsewhere and on seasonal fluctuations during any one year. No clear picture of the reasons for turnover emerges from Table 3. Certainly in Port Alice, the 'dislike work' category is not nearly as high as in Kitimat, while the 'personal' category may well include 'dislike of location' as well as family problems.

In studying turnover and transiency in Port Alice, the Horsfall study concluded that there were two faces to the transient problem:

> First, we have the traditionally transient group, young, single millworkers who expect to and do, stay for a limited time before moving on to another job. Second, an inherently stable group (including a large proportion of skilled workers) tends to move out when children reach secondary school age.[32]

Labor movements and migrations in the new instant towns are also influenced by industry cycles. These cycles affect both the availability of alternate work elsewhere, and the likelihood of layoffs within a mine or mill attached to an instant town. The lack of regional controls over growth often produces heavy immigration in expansionary periods, followed by net outmigration in periods of recession. This leads to higher labor mobility and turnover rates, and creates instability in local communities. Some experience high turnover regardless of the state of the business cycle.[33]

Further reasons for high turnover can be found in the dual effects of industrial alienation and a related feeling that the owners are far away and care little about the work process as long as it returns a profit. 'They don't know what it is like to live and work up here,' complained one group of instant town workers, 'they probably have never heard of our town, let alone know where it is, or what our problems are.'[34] Worker alienation may also be derived from repetitive or otherwise non-stimulating tasks.[35] This, together with the position of workers in large plants in isolated and remote sites, combines to produce an industrial 'climate' peculiar to resource frontiers. Within this 'climate,' the degree of industrial alienation is exacerbated by the single enterprise operations common to other resource frontier communities. The corporate domination of work and community and the existence of company paternalism, whether explicit or implicit, has undoubtedly had an influence on worker alienation and labor turnover. Cram, for instance, cited several reasons for worker turnover and job dissatisfaction in his 1969 study of five northern Canadian resource settlements.[36] He claimed that the most important unfilled needs of workers were in the areas of 'esteem,' which he interpreted as due credit for work done, job respectability in the eyes of others, and the apparent value of the job to the company, and in the area of 'self-actualization,' which he interpreted as the worker feeling that his job is worthwhile, making use of all available skills and abilities, and the achievement of some self-improvement on the job. The effects of separation of ownership and control from the worker and the workplace

Table 3:
Reasons for labor terminations, Port Alice Pulp Mills, 1960-1973

Termination Reason	% All Terminations (1960-1973)	% Terminations in First Year of Employment
Dislike location	8.0	8.7
Dislike work	2.6	3.9
Dislike both	0.8	0.4
Subtotal	11.4	13.0
Alternate job	20.7	14.2
Fired	15.1	26.4
Health	2.5	3.5
Personal	31.9	27.5
Other	18.4	15.4
Total	100.0	100.0

Source: R.B. Horsfall *et al*, 'Parameters of Healthful Community Functioning and Individual Functioning in Resource Frontier Towns, Port Alice, B.C.' A report prepared for the Department of Health and Welfare, Ottawa, 1974, pp. 120-121.

was noted by workers in instant towns. Several reports stressed that not only was ownership vested in some far distant site, but that it was held by an international management and ownership class whose interests did not match those of the workers in the small resource settlements of the Canadian hinterland.[37]

Furthermore, as Farstad noted in his research report on industrial development in the hinterland northwest of British Columbia:

> . . . basic parameters of growth are determined by a demand for resources external to the hinterland. In B.C., the demand for resources occurs not only outside the hinterland, it occurs primarily outside Canada. The scope and rate of development is therefore beyond the control of local residents. This is the cause of continuing alienation in the hinterland directed against the metropolis.[38]

Thus, alienated workers tend to use the towns as places in which to work for short periods to gain money before moving on to new jobs or back to the larger urban centers of the province. Evidence drawn from the instant towns of Port Alice, Granisle, and Mackenzie in British Columbia in 1973 and 1974, indicates that the pattern of short-term stays and a lack of attachment to the settlement as a 'home town' was a contributor to the high rates of turnover.[39]

The data on turnover suggest a slight decrease in the early seventies in some of the instant towns. It is likely that this decrease occurred among married couples and families, for the very nature of the instant towns, with their stress on homeownership and associated high municipal taxes, did mean that some families were much less mobile than they would have been in a company town. Often houses are difficult to sell at a good price. Moving costs are high from isolated areas. Thus, younger workers with no family ties are generally more mobile and hence less attached to a place or work, while families, by virtue of the high social and economic costs of mobility, cannot move readily from job to job.

Demographic Structures

Distorted demographic structures have remained in the instant towns, despite government and company attempts to reduce the age and sex imbalances characteristic of company towns. In 1971, for instance, the average sex ratio in instant towns was 1.46:1.00 compared to 1.10:1.00 for all other urban areas in British Columbia, excluding Vancouver and Victoria. Indeed, seven of

Table 4:
Sex Ratios for selected resource towns in British Columbia, 1971

Town	Total	Males	Females	M/F Ratio
Tahsis	1,350	815	435	1.80:1.00
Ocean Falls	2,935	1,790	1,145	1.56:1.00
Port Alice	1,510	915	595	1.53:1.00
Fraser Lake	1,295	730	565	1.29:1.00
Ucluelet	1,015	565	450	1.25:1.00
Trail	11,150	5,665	4,515	1.25:1.00
Stewart	1,355	755	600	1.25:1.00
Mackenzie	2,330	1,290	1,040	1.24:1.00
Sparwood	3,990	1,630	1,360	1.19:1.00
Valemount	690	375	315	1.19:1.00
Houston	2,235	1,210	1,025	1.18:1.00
Port Hardy	1,765	955	810	1.18:1.00
Kitimat	11,805	6,340	5,465	1.16:1.00

Source: Canada Census, *1971 Census on Age and Sex Structures, Small Towns in British Columbia.* Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1972.

the province's most male-dominated settlements in 1971 were instant towns (see Table 4).

There is evidence that in some instant towns the degree of the sex imbalance has decreased somewhat. In Port Alice, for instance, the ratio dropped from 1.81 males per female in 1966, to 1.52 in 1971 and 1.41 in 1976. The policy of attracting families thus appears to have brought more females into the community. The imbalance, however, remains marked. Males made up 64.4% of Port Alice's population in 1966 and 59% ten years later (see Table 5). In the working age groups, males are particularly dominant. In 1976, the 20-34 age group formed one-third of the total population. There were 320 males of these ages compared to 200 females. Yet this was an improvement on conditions ten years earlier. Men of this age dropped from 24.1% to 21.4% of the total population; women increased from 9.2% to 13.3%. The trend among the 35-54 year olds was similar but slightly less marked.

The policy of attracting some families to Port Alice to work is not reflected in the place of children in the demographic structure. The percentage of children under ten years of age has decreased from 21.6% of the population in 1966 to 16.6% in 1976, while children and teenagers have increased somewhat (16.6% to 20%). This is difficult to explain with the existing data. Some families moving into the community are young married couples without children who tend to be short-term stayers—they do not contribute to the numbers of young children in the town. Other families with teenage children who would once have moved away to procure a better education and to escape the male-dominated society, may now be staying in the townsite. These particular family groups may be staying perhaps because of lack of alternative work, the high costs of moving, or because they perceive local education to be adequate.

With a relatively small proportion of children, women and old people, Port Alice remains a town made up predominantly of workers. In 1966, people aged 15 to 64 made up 69.1% of the population; ten years later they were 73%. There are few old people or those who could be considered as grandparents in the community. Equally there are few single women. For both single and married women, there is little opportunity for employment. Jobs are limited to service occupations in the town site or clerical and laboratory jobs in the pulp mill. The small percentage of women aged 20-34 reflects this reality. Such an unbalanced situation does not promote long stays in town by younger men. Nor does such a male-domi-

Table 5:
Percentage of persons in age groups, 1966, 1971, and 1976, Port Alice, British Columbia

Age group	1966 (pop. 1,383)			1971 (pop. 1,510)			1976 (pop. 1,495)			Change in % Shares 1966-76		
	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F	Total	M	F
						(percent)						
0-4	11.3	6.5	4.8	11.5	6.3	5.2	7.3	3.3	4.0	—4.0	—3.2	—0.8
5-9	10.3	5.5	4.8	11.5	6.6	4.9	9.3	5.3	4.0	—1.0	—0.2	—0.8
10-14	8.5	4.8	3.7	9.6	5.3	4.3	9.7	5.7	4.0	+1.1	+0.9	+0.2
15-19	8.0	4.7	3.3	7.8	4.3	3.5	10.3	6.0	4.3	+2.3	+1.3	+1.0
20-24	14.5	11.2	3.3	12.9	7.9	5.0	13.0	8.4	4.6	—1.5	—2.8	+1.3
25-34	18.8	12.9	5.9	21.8	14.2	7.6	21.7	13.0	8.7	+2.9	+0.1	+2.8
35-44	15.2	10.1	5.1	11.6	6.9	4.7	11.7	7.0	4.7	—3.4	—3.0	—0.4
45-54	8.7	5.4	3.3	8.6	5.6	3.0	10.4	6.3	4.1	+1.7	+0.9	+0.8
55-64	4.0	3.2	0.8	4.4	3.0	1.4	6.0	3.7	2.3	+2.0	+0.5	+1.5
65-69	0.1	0.1	—	0.3	0.3	—	0.6	0.3	0.3	+0.5	+0.2	+0.3
70+	0.6	—	0.6	—	—	—	—	—	—	—0.6	—	—0.6
Total males & females		64.4	35.6		60.4	39.6		59.0	41.0		—5.4	+5.4

Source: Canada Census, 1966, 1971, 1976. Population by specific age groups and sex.

nated society contribute to community stability or personal satisfaction.

Isolation

If the instant town policy was unsuccessful in modifying traditional demographic patterns and turnover, it was even less successful in dealing with the physical isolation and personal isolation, and the sense of impermanence of resource based communities. Most of British Columbia's new instant towns are, like their predecessors, company-dominated towns, geographically isolated simply because resources are not always located in any one central place. The communities are, almost without exception, found in the sparsely settled areas of British Columbia. The particular location and isolation factors almost guarantee that each settlement will remain a single enterprise community. The rationale of location also rules out the possibility of additional industry and mitigates against diversification of the economic base and the expansion of population. By virtue of the nature of the enterprise, therefore, the factor of isolation is self-perpetuating.

It is important to distinguish between several types of isolation. There is, for instance, inter-community isolation which is largely a matter of distance and geographical location, and there is intra-community isolation, or the isolation felt by individuals which is commonly derived from interpersonal relationships. Both forms of isolation are related to the degree of accessibility of alternative facilities and alternate social relationships. The individual's feelings are related to a wish to take part in some desired or alternative activity. However, it is important to note that such feelings are not peculiar to isolated settlements, being commonly experienced by other rural or urban dwellers, even if not so acutely. Therefore, this particular kind of isolation which is manifest in remote towns, rather than being unique to any single-enterprise community, is shared to some degree by many individuals in a number of different milieus. The isolation experienced in remote resource towns is, however, exacerbated by composite factors related to industrial alienation, community instability, turnover, demographic circumstances, the absence of female companionship, and female employment opportunities.

The planners of the new resource towns in British Columbia in the 1960s were cognizant of the impact of isolation on workers who were going to live in the new settlements. They conceded that the lack of alternate sources of entertainment and recreation was partly responsible for the effects of isolation and therefore attempted to overcome them by planning for recreational facilities in the form of ice arenas, libraries, community centers, bowling alleys, and hotels, all as part of the urban infrastructure of each settlement. However, the circumstances of each individual vary widely, and, in most new resource towns, there are persons who respond favorably to the provision of recreational facilities and others who do not. The result in the towns was that the feelings of isolation often persisted despite the availability of recreation. The absence of alternate or adequate commercial services also contributed to the expressed feelings of isolation in resource towns, particularly where there were no choices of sales outlets available, where local monopoly was evident, and where prices were higher than in adjacent centers or in a metropolitan center.

Feelings of isolation and expressions of such phenomena as 'bush-fever' or 'cabin-fever' are often relative to the background experience of each person. For some people, the isolation is an attractive feature which is readily incorporated as part of a lifestyle, but for others, the isolation is only accentuated by a lack of experience or unwillingness to incorporate these features of isolation into their lifestyles. The benefits as seen by some workers are hunting, fishing, boating, and a general attraction to the outdoors; but, for others who feel the effects of isolation, the so-called attractions are perceived as part of a hostile physical environment.

Several researchers have dealt with the impact of isolation on workers in northern resource communities. One study found

78% of the people questioned in Port Alice felt isolated either 'always' or 'sometimes.'[40] Others have examined some of the more individual or personal and psychological aspects of lifestyles and isolation in remote communities. The findings of these studies suggest the isolation factor in remote instant towns is also part of an interlocking cycle of instability and impermanence. Where settlements and mills are isolated by virtue of their location and their distance from other towns, the tendency for short-term stays by workers is often increased. This may lead to quick turnover which in turn reinforces any sense of impermanence experienced or expressed by workers. Such a sense is in turn exacerbated by the awareness that the company operating as the sole, or as the major employer, does not regard its activities as being permanent or fixed in any one place; the sense of isolation, impermanence and instability is thus self-reinforcing.[41]

Mental Health

Arising from the general problems already found in company and instant towns, there are serious and individual social conditions which seem especially prevalent and noticeable in the instant towns in the 1960s. The Fowkes Report intimated that individuals within new communities, especially instant towns, were prone to mental health problems and industrial health problems.[42] While the data on which the Fowkes Report was based are incomplete, other work corroborates its conclusions.

Three separate investigations, commented on the high incidence of mental health problems in new resource towns in British Columbia. Overstall, for instance, stated in 1974 that:

> In human terms the rapid development of the resource extracting industries of B.C. must be termed a failure. While the creation of instant towns and the accelerated growth of existing communities can be justified in an economic sense, the process has so eroded personal and community spirit that severe social, mental and physical sickness is endemic.[43]

However, Overstall was careful to point out that there is an important differential impact of industrial culture in northern resource towns between what he identified as the pioneers, or old time residents, and the new arrivals, who take advantage of job opportunities and developmental possibilities to make good money and move back south. Morris and Latham, in separate observations in British Columbia, commented on mental health problems in new resource towns, with specific references to the instant town of Port Alice on northern Vancouver Island.[44] Morris reported that the incidence of mental health problems as a manifestation of rapid industrial growth and the migration of 'southern workers' to isolated resource towns, had become increasingly noticeable. Supporting evidence was supplied by Overstall, who in his investigations of northern mental health problems, indicated that in the new industrial towns of Kitimat and Houston, there is a large percentage of high risk families.[45]

It must be noted however that further research in the field of mental health is needed before conclusive statements can be made about this particular aspect of life in northern Canadian resource towns.

Conclusion

The instant towns of British Columbia are still resource towns dependent on one resource and one company. As such they are dependent on the prices and the demands of a world market and economy. Their owners are now multinational corporations located in the metropolises of the world. The people of the towns are very much aware of this, and of the fact that their enterprise is only a small one in a large empire. Day-to-day work and living conditions of the workforce are dependent upon decisions made by corporate executives not only at the local level, but at the level of national and international centers of control. The dependence on a single resource and on world markets has not changed. The ownership has altered, and with it the legal status and the appearance of some of the towns.

In the new instant towns, the insecurity and the isolation of company towns may remain, but now there are suburban type townsites, more recreational facilities, local government, and a new type of workforce.

The government and the companies wanted to attract families. They had to appeal to urban workers and to immigrants. Their promotional literature stressed the urban amenities of the towns, so instant towns, to a degree, tended to be peopled by urbanites. It is a moot point whether the towns attract unstable people or whether the personal and physical isolation leads to mental illness. Certainly high rates of depression among both housewives and workers are a feature of life in instant towns. However, the causal relationship here, as in other northern and isolated communities, needs to be examined further and very closely.

The emphasis on attracting families and promoting homeownership meant that many families become locked into such communities by mortgages, high taxes, and high costs of living. The instant town legislation succeeded in transferring the costs of running a township from the company to the workers. The people, in return for the chance to govern themselves and own their homes whether they wanted to or not, pay the price of creating a new and livable townsite. The instant towns with their planned appearance, their rigid building codes, their urban appearance, and largely urban workforce, are an imprint in the hinterland of the corporate and government identities in the metropolis that created them, and that, in varying degree, continue to dominate and control them.

Under the boom conditions of resource extraction in British Columbia in the 1960s, the instant towns were a clearly defined outcome of the needs of resource companies in the hinterland. Given the nature of this expansion and the response by the provincial government in British Columbia to the demands for development of infrastructure, they were an efficient means of providing accommodation and servicing the extraction process at the time. The social and economic conditions in the instant towns tended to respond to external and global constraints, as well as to the local circumstances dictated by the social and economic relationships of the workplace and the work process. The planning policy, while it improved the physical appearance of resource towns, did not alleviate the social and economic problems inherent in a one-industry resource based community structure. The urban planning which took place in the townsites was more a measure to provide facilities and effect changes in the ownership structure and housing policies of the new townsites. The policies of the British Columbia government meshed with the requirements of multinational firms involved in resource extraction.

The government policy under the *Instant Towns Act* attempted to regulate the planning and location of towns and the enfranchisement of the citizens. The town planners for the resource companies attempted to create better built environments and to provide an adequate supply of housing and services. The attempt to improve physical conditions in the towns was relatively successful. However, the attempt to change or influence community age structures, sex ratios, and labor turnover was less so. A broader spectrum of population has been drawn into the instant towns and the arrival of these people in isolated communities seems to have created new problems of community and personal instability rather than curing the older problems of turnover and male domination. Such attempts to modify a long-standing pattern of growth in the towns must be judged against the existence of a distinctive social fabric in communities attached to resource extraction enterprises in isolated areas. The basic structure of dependency on one company, company domination of local affairs, and the trend of rapid turnover in new resource towns, remains as the dominant shaping force in the instant towns in British Columbia. It seems that the resource companies themselves have achieved one of their objectives—to transfer the costs of running and organizing the townsites to the communities and to the provincial government. Whether the instant towns will in the future progress toward what Lucas called 'the stage of maturity,'[46] will depend upon the viability of the economic base and the economic fortunes of the companies on the world market as had been the case before instant towns were created.

Appendix

Foundations of Official Community Plan, District of Mackenzie

'*Purpose:* The official community plan is intended to serve as a record of land use and development policies for the information and guidance of private and public agencies and individuals to ensure that administrative decisions concerned with these policies or any refinements or necessary alterations to these policies are made within an appropriate framework and with due regard to over-all objectives and not as *ad hoc* decisions.

Basic concepts: The official community plan is based generally upon:

a the objective of establishing all industrial forest processing plants utilizing . . . sustained yield units and the supporting residential and service facilities within one integrated community . . . ;
b prevention of the formation of any haphazard or satellite development . . . ;
c the accommodation, the standards of the District of Mackenzie, of persons and facilities whose relocation may prove necessary or desirable because of the reservoir created, or the establishment of the . . . sustained yield unit . . . ;
d the suitability of the various parts of the area for different land-uses . . . ;
e the achievement of relationships and communications between different classes of land use which will provide an efficient, convenient, and pleasant community for the optimum economic and social benefit of its inhabitants.

The plan seeks to achieve these objectives by setting out a schematic arrangement of land uses which:

a maintain most of the area as a non-urban area;
b creates an industrial area for the accommodation of forest industry processing plants and any other basic or secondary industries well separated from residential, servicing facilities, and institutions within the townsite;
c creates an attractive townsite which will be compact and oriented to a strong central core area containing retail and service commercial facilities, and recreational, social, and educational facilities serving the municipality as a whole;
d recognizes the need for a degree of flexibility so that the social and economic needs of the community can be met as they evolve and specific needs for housing and facilities are manifested.'

Source: *British Columbia Gazette*, June 2, 1966, Appendix 1, Official Community Plan, District of Mackenzie, Letters Patent. Victoria: Queen's Printer, 1966.

NOTES

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cf. Manitoba, *Local Government Districts Act*, Revised Statutes of Manitoba, c148, SI, 'An Act to provide for the establishment of local government districts in unorganised municipalities in Manitoba.' Winnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970.
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2 See the following works by the author for examples of discussions on British Columbia Instant Towns: J.H. Bradbury, 'New Settlements Policy in British Columbia,' *Urban History Review*, vol. VIII, no. 2, October, 1979, pp. 47-76; 'Towards an Alternative Theory of Resource Based Town Development in Canada,' *Economic Geography*, vol. 55, no. 2, April 1979, pp. 147-166; 'Class Structures and Class Conflicts in Instant Resource Towns in British Columbia—1965 to 1972,' *B.C. Studies*, no. 37, Spring 1978, pp. 3-18; and 'The Instant Towns of British Columbia: A Settlement Response to the Metropolitan Call on the Productive Base,' in L.J. Evenden (ed.), *Vancouver: Western Metropolis*, Western Geographical Series, vol. 16, Department of Geography. Victoria: University of Victoria, 1978, pp. 117-133.

3 I.M. Robinson, *New Industrial Towns in Canada's Resource Frontier*. Chicago: Department of Geography, University of Chicago, Research Paper 73, 1962. (Note that Robinson mentions some of the previous attempts in British Columbia to create municipalities in resource towns, e.g.,—'The government also is encouraging old-style Company Towns to seek municipal status, even though they remain economically dependent on a single-enterprise . . . . In 1955 the provincial legislature passed a special act permitting Powell River, an old-style company town . . . . to amalgamate with several surrounding communities to form a single urban political unit . . . . ,' p. 42. For further information on the history of resource town legislation in British Columbia, see J.H. Bradbury, 'New Settlements Policy in British Columbia,' *op. cit.*, pp. 54-56.

4 R.A. Lucas, *Minetown, Milltown, Railtown: Life in a Canadian Community of Single Industry.*

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5 Much of the information in this and following sections comes from the author's own research and may be found in J.H. Bradbury, 'Instant Resource Towns in British Columbia, 1965-1972,' unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1977.

6 Between 1965 and 1972 there was no overall failure of Instant Towns in British Columbia, although several had been threatened by changing industrial patterns, price changes, competition, and stringent pollution control regulations, e.g., Port Alice and Mackenzie. While there was no actual failure up to 1972, a total of nine older resource based communities and company towns had declined or were abandoned in the period 1965 to 1972 when the instant towns were being constructed, giving an indication of the cyclical and unstable character of many resource extraction towns in British Columbia.

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The Uncertain Consciousness of Planners and the Professional Enterprise*

Howell S. Baum

Introduction

Planners are one of a number of groups of experts offering advice about physical or social development to decision-makers. Others include policy analysts, systems analysts, engineers, architects, lawyers, and management scientists.[1] What these practitioners share is the claim that they possess intellectual expertise which is both specialized and essential for effective societal decision-making. As the demand for this type of expertise has grown, schools have been established to provide systematic training for future practitioners. The creation of educational programs has given force to a growing sense of professionalism on the part of these expert advice-givers. This sense has been accompanied, in turn, by a move toward professionalization, with groups of practitioners beginning to stake out areas of practice.

The professionalization of this advice-giving, as of any type of practice, is a political process. Any group of experts who want exclusive authority in an identified area of advice-giving will have to persuade public decision-makers that the group's knowledge is specialized, substantial, reliable, and important—and, crucially, that it should be accepted. Prior to engaging in such a campaign, a group of experts needs to develop a shared consciousness of themselves as practitioners who are doing similar work and have common interests.[2] In order to develop a professional consciousness, the group must be able to identify the central components of their work. In addition, they need to be able to distinguish their expertise from that of others and to argue on some grounds for its superiority.

These issues have significance for planners as 'planning' has extended into diverse fields. The strand of planning which is concerned with physical design has brought planners into contact with architects and engineers. The strand of planning which is concerned with public administration has brought planners into contact with 'social' workers of various types, managers, and lawyers. This historical extension of planning may have paradoxical effects. On the one hand, it has motivated concern about delineating the area of practice which belongs to planning. For example, more than two decades ago, a group of New Jersey planners began lobbying for licensing of planners as a means of protecting their domain against, variously, architects, landscape architects, lawyers, and engineers. On the other hand, it is likely that this diversification has made it increasingly difficult for planners to develop a professional consciousness based on a clear view of the central components of planning.

Page's and Lang's study of Canadian planners[3] provides evidence that there is not a consensus among planners about the central components of their work or distinctions between their work and that of others.[4] The planners whom they interviewed were divided in their views about the purposes of planning. In describing the attributes and skills of good planners, they referred to such general characteristics as common sense, sound judgment, communicational ability, and the ability to think comprehensively. When asked about planning ethics, a number of planners either were not familiar with the specifics of the

*I would like to acknowledge the helpful suggestions of John Forester and Melvin Levin in revising earlier drafts of this article.

Canadian Institute of Planners' *Code of Professional Conduct* or did not take it seriously. Most suggestions for changes in the code argued for greater discretion for individual planners in evaluating ethical issues.

Fewer than one-third of the planners were in favor of restricting the practice of planning through licensing. Comments regarding changes in the Canadian Institute of Planners emphasized, first, continuing education programs but also gave high importance to breaking down barriers between planners and other practitioners. Planners wanted the organization to establish closer relations with practitioners in other professions and to widen Institute membership to include a broad range of planners. At the same time, almost half wanted the Institute to improve the public image of planning. Three-fourths of the planners agreed with the statement that urban and regional planning is not well defined. This brief summary of the Page-Lang study suggests that Canadian planners may be satisfied with their personal practice but do not have a shared consciousness of themselves as members of a well-defined profession.

The purpose of this article is to examine the professional consciousness of a sample of planners in the United States, to see whether they have a unified self-image or whether they may share some of the uncertainties of Canadian planners.

The Study

Planners were sampled randomly from the membership of the Maryland Chapter of the American Institute of Planners (A.I.P.). This selection procedure was expected to include practitioners in diverse roles and settings who would be likely to have a strong identification with planning. Fifty persons were interviewed, representing a 25 percent sample of the chapter membership. The sample had the following characteristics:

- 88% male, 12% female;
- 94% white, 6% black and other;
- age range from 26 to 78; median age of 37;
- income range from \$10,000 to \$40,000 and over; median income between \$20,000 and \$24,999;
- 68% employed in public agencies, evenly divided between administration and staff, 32% employed as private consultants;
- undergraduate backgrounds: 24% architecture, 20% engineering, 52% social science, and 4% other; master's degrees: 74% planning, 26% other; and
- 64% working in physical planning, 14% in transportation, 10% in social planning, and 12% in other fields.

With respect to sex, race, age, income, and place of employment the sample is representative of the population of planners enumerated in the 1970 United States Census[5] and of the national membership of the American Institute of Planners.[6,7] These sample characteristics are also similar to the characteristics of the Page-Lang sample of Canadian planners.[8] Compared to the national A.I.P. membership and the Canadian sample, this sample appears to have a stronger undergraduate social science background and a weaker engineering background, as well as more graduate training in planning and other areas. No national data permit comparisons about the distribution of specialty fields in which planners are working.

The planners were interviewed about their perceptions of both the content and context of their work, including their personal strengths and obstacles to their effectiveness. Additionally, they were questioned about identification with other planners, planners' organizations, and measures being taken to protect planners' scope of practice. The instrument was a semi-structured questionnaire, which confronted respondents with some limited choices but also encouraged open-ended responses to questions. Responses to fixed-choice questions could be directly quantified. Open-ended responses could be coded into categories and then quantified. The interviews, which averaged an hour and a half, were conducted between July 1977 and July 1978.

Planners' responses are presented below in a manner consistent with the research methods of qualitative analysis.[9] The statistical distribution of planners' statements is indicated. In addition, for each type of response to a question, quotations are presented which are representative of the content of comments made.

What Do Planners Do?

In order to identify the areas of practice which planners regard as their domain, one question asked them what they regarded as their strengths as planners.

One successful administrator impulsively retorted, 'I didn't know that I had any [strengths]!' A number of planners responded to the question with a long pause. Others declared succinctly, 'I don't know.' Following the pause or the apology, planners still felt that they *should* have answers to the question and offered responses. Some descriptions of personal strengths were simply general observations about being able to draw on rich personal experience. Other planners offered their views that they had so far succeeded by being jacks-of-all-trades. A typical statement was this:

I don't know. One of the greatest strengths that planners have [note: although the question asked the planner about himself, he answered with regard to 'planners' in general] . . . is an attempt to put together eclectic processes that work toward good solutions . . . someone that is a generalist who tries to put it together.

Finally, a number of planners offered responses which referred to some skills which they believed that they had mastered and which distinguished them as practitioners. The skills mentioned may be grouped into two categories: intellectual skills and interpersonal or political skills. When the responses to the question about personal strengths were analyzed, 88 percent of the sample referred to some type of intellectual skill. Approximately one-third of these planners also referred to interpersonal skills. The other 12 percent mentioned only interpersonal skills.

The following statements provide representative examples of the ways in which planners described their intellectual skills:

I think I am good [at] analysis and evaluation of the results. I am also good at developing procedures and schemes that serve the immediate needs.

I think the thing probably is in synthesis. I am not a data freak. I enjoy getting together all the information because it is necessary. But the challenge is to say, what does it all mean? Which I would call the synthesis phase. That is when I can contribute the most.

The ability to remove myself from the day and look at the future to get a decent reading on what is happening . . . in order to have an air of predictability which you can be relatively sure about.

These statements are typical of the responses. Although planners elsewhere cited particular techniques when asked what planners could do that lay citizens could not, here they mentioned few specific skills. Rather, in attempting to identify their strengths, planners described a general way of thinking, encompassing an ability to analyze a problem situation, to collect information about it, and to synthesize the information in such a way as to identify alternative courses of action and their likely consequences. Most of the planners interviewed draw regularly on this way of thinking. Yet what many planners found disappointing was their inability to provide a clearer articulation of what this way of thinking involved and what intellectual or other assets they could contribute to it.

In addition to intellectual skills, planners mentioned several types of interpersonal skills in descriptions of their personal strengths. One skill often mentioned is essentially a bridge between the intellectual and the interpersonal:

My ability to deal with complex matters, to integrate them and to help other people understand them, so that they can make intelligent choices, without sacrificing too much of the detail.

Administrators are most frequently expected to work with others, and they tended to be particularly inclined to identify interpersonal skills as their strength. One administrator expressed the viewpoint of many administrators when he emphasized his strength

as a manager, a synergist, where I can bring together different disciplines, where I can orchestrate things, and out of it comes something physical. That is what I do best.

Another administrator, with two decades of experience, emphasized, as did many planners, what he considered the power of a general ability to 'get along with people':

My personal greatest strength is an ability to work with people. I am not a great administrator, and I am not a fantastic organizer. But I have been able to break through barriers and get people to talk with each other. We have to resolve differences which will occur unless we do communicate. Coordination, communication is so vital in these things.

These statements about interpersonal strengths resemble the statements about intellectual strengths in that they do not mention many specific skills. But, as with the other statements, they adumbrate a process, in this case a social process. Most planners, by virtue of working in organizations, inescapably are part of interpersonal processes. Yet relatively few identify any skill in negotiating these processes as a personal strength, and many of these feel uncomfortable that they can describe this type of skill only in general terms.

If all the responses to this question were articulated into a planners' definition of planning, they might be summarized in the following way. Planning is a problem-solving process, in which the primary task is to collect and organize information in order to identify a solution for a given problem. Sometimes the skills involved in handling information are relatively sophisticated; often they involve common sense. For many planners this problem-solving process requires working with other people. The skills involved in interpersonal relations are difficult to describe precisely, and sometimes they seem intuitive.

This portrayal of planning conveys several impressions. The first is that a significant number of planners are not certain whether they have strengths—or, at least, whether their strengths in practice are peculiar to the occupation of planning. Second, even though almost every planner identifies some intellectual ability as a strength, few planners can describe clearly just what skills are involved. Third, even though most planners are involved in interpersonal processes, few mention having any strength in this area, and the few who claim to have interpersonal skills are not very clear about what they are. Planners feel uncomfortable holding these impressions of themselves. They expect to be able to be more articulate about what they do.

What Ethical Principles Do Planners Follow?

A traditional view of a profession is that it is a collectivity of practitioners who exercise specialized skills within ethical bounds set by the collectivity. Planners' statements about personal strengths do not provide a description of specialized activities which could be clearly considered the technical core of a profession. Nevertheless, it might be possible that planners consider themselves unified by a distinct ethical direction. In order to examine this possibility, the sample was asked to summarize what were regarded as the major principles of professional planning ethics as they applied to the planners' own work.

A number of planners impulsively answered that they didn't know what professional planning ethics were. Others paused for a long time before responding. Several offered rational discussions about the difficulty of identifying ethics specific to the practice of planning. A few planners argued that the question about ethics is really irrelevant: they contended that it would be easy to identify the tenets of planning ethics but that bureaucratic constraints on planners' discretion are so great that these tenets do not matter. However, the perplexity which these comments attempted to mask is conveyed by the answer offered by one planner with ten years of experience:

I really haven't thought about ethics as such to be able to answer that right off the cuff.Just do what you think is the right thing to do in regard to whatever situation. I don't think that planning ethics as such are different from what you would call professional ethics. What professional ethics are, I don't know either. Just handle yourself in a businesslike, a professional manner.

Another planner was more blunt: 'I don't like these questions.'

Nevertheless, after confessions of ignorance or discomfort or long pauses, most planners felt the need to present some statement of professional ethics. One group prefaced their response with the statement that they do follow ethics in practice but that their ethics are personal, not tied to the planning profession. An administrator with many years of experience said:

I don't have a list of ethics, except that it is visceral, almost, just how my fibers respond to it. I'm not a religious person, so I have no Judeo-Christian ethic to fall back on, but I do things which people consider ethical. How people act is much more important than their attitude.

With regard to the content of their ethics, approximately one-third (34 percent) of the planners answered the request to summarize principles of planning ethics with descriptions of technical principles which should be followed in 'good' planning. One representative statement was given by a planning administrator with a decade of experience:

I think of it [professional planning ethics] in terms of a body of knowledge, in terms of a way of solving a problem, looking at alternatives, evaluating alternatives, and coming up with a recommendation . . . . I guess it is a planning ethic to evaluate alternatives.

For many planners, the primary orientation of planning 'ethics' is experienced as technical. Their ethics refer to the process of doing planning work, without giving external direction for that work.

The remaining two-thirds (66 percent) of the planners mentioned some type of ethical tenets in their responses. Many pertained to responsibilities to the interests of a client. Many statements referred to a duty to serve a 'public interest.' They reflected a traditional claim of planners to bring some form of rationality to decision-making in order that the public interest be served. The response of one local staff planner combined a number of these concerns:

Basic planning ethics are that you are looking at the good of the larger community, versus the interest of any specific interest group. And also, as a corollary, that you want to bring to bear a more rigorous analysis to the situation than simply, 'Give me' or 'I want'—that you should apply the planning process as a more disciplined approach to your problem-solving.

From this perspective, professional planning ethics urge planners to seek systematically to collect information in order to identify and to serve the interests of 'the public' whenever possible.

Planners' responses to the question to summarize professional planning ethics leave several impressions. The first is the initial inability of many planners to articulate any code of ethics, no matter how trivial. Regardless of whether statements about ethics correspond to behavior, it is remarkable that so many planners are unable even to provide the rhetoric of ethical tenets which come so readily from many other groups of practitioners. The second important impression is the discomfort which planners experience with their difficulty in identifying ethical principles which guide them. This discomfort suggests that many planners do not feel that they follow clear ethical directions in their work. Third, a significant group of planners translate 'ethical' issues into technical issues. Instead of describing ethical ends for the products of their work, they refer to technical standards for the process of their work.

What Do Planners Have in Common?

The responses to the preceding questions raise serious questions about the consciousness of planners as practitioners. Regarding their strengths in practice, many planners have difficulty describing what they do well. Regarding the ethical principles of planning, many planners have difficulty describing what tenets guide them. Nevertheless, it may be possible that planners do feel that they share responsibilities or a sense of purpose with other planners. In order to explore whether planners do regard other planners as a significant reference group, the sample was asked to what degree they were influenced in their work by the expectations of the planning profession.

A majority of planners (54 percent) reported that they were 'not at all' or only 'slightly' influenced by the planning profession in their work. Less than one-third (30 percent) said that they were 'completely' or 'considerably' influenced by the profession. The remainder (16 percent) were 'moderately' influenced.

One group of planners depict themselves as working in isolation from any identifiable professional reference group. One-third of the planners questioned about being influenced by the expectations of the planning profession declared outright that they did not know what the expectations of the profession were. Many planners would like to take guidance from a professional representative but when they do not find it become resentful toward whoever should have but did not fill the perceived vacuum of intellectual and political leadership. One planner expressed the essence of this feeling:

I am not sure what the expectations of the planning profession are. I guess it would be hard for me to be guided by them if I don't know what they are. I read that stuff that comes out of the American Institute of Planners, and I cannot relate to that. The A.I.P. as a national organization . . . it seems to me that we [*sic*] have always been behind what is happening.

Other planners who appear to work in isolation respond to their desire to be guided by a profession by suggesting that perhaps coincidentally they may be doing what a professional leadership would want them to be doing. A young public agency administrator expressed this relatively more sanguine view:

I don't know what planning is. It is hard to say what the expectations are of something you cannot define. I think my outlook is guided, rather, by some concrete expectation, by my training, and my reading of the planning literature. I have internalized planning attitudes. I don't know if they are listed anywhere. I feel that my attitudes in many ways are attitudes that planners have, but I am not sure I could write them down. Maybe the A.I.P. codes . . . . Sometimes I go back to the A.I.P. *Code of Ethics* . . . . I use the A.I.P. *Code of Ethics* as a crutch, to affirm my position. I am falling back on the professional training. I am always falling back on my own moral outlook. It helps to have it written by a profession.

Other planners report that they do draw guidance from an identifiable professional reference group. Some planners working in non-traditional fields state that they receive little guidance from an identifiable planning profession and turn instead to colleagues. One planner with ten years of experience said:

There is a reference group, but I am not sure that I can indicate what it is. It is not the planning profession, and it is not the A.I.P. It is to some degree the people with whom I work.

Another elaborated that she 'wouldn't stick to the planning profession' but would turn to any 'professionals who are involved in the same field, but that is not necessarily planners.' For other planners the reference group may be agency colleagues.

Finally, there is a group of planners who feel a need for affiliation with a professional organization and who feel that they identify with other planners across the country. In contrast with some planners quoted initially, they do not see the planning profession run by 'others'; rather, they regard themselves as active movers of the profession as practice changes. This view is aptly expressed by a young planner:

I feel that what I am doing is not in isolation from the planning profession. I feel comfortable that my profession has norms and certain expectations. I am in an agency that is doing a type of work that is similar to agencies doing work from other metropolitan areas. I like to compare what I am doing with what other people and groups are doing in comparable situations and see what they are doing, to see whether the goals and output and thinking are comparable with what other similar people are doing.

One strong impression emerges from these statements about the influence of the planning profession over personal practice. For most planners there is no clearly identifiable 'planning profession' which serves as a reference group. Those who do report being significantly influenced by the planning profession refer to it as a source of intellectual guidance but infrequently say that it is a cohesive group whose fortunes they feel they share. Nevertheless, many want both guidance and the emotional support which comes from a sense of belonging to a group. A minority feel that they receive this support; others are disappointed or become resentful when they do not.

How Are Planners Different From Other Practitioners?

Questions about strengths in practice, ethical norms for work, and influence by expectations of a professional group evoke, at best, a weak expression of a shared professional consciousness among planners. Still, there is one other way in which planners may feel some sense of shared work and interest: at the least, they may define themselves negatively through clear ideas about whom they would choose to exclude from the practice of 'planning.' One common way in which practitioners stake out an area of practice is through the establishment of licensing procedures. As noted above, planners in New Jersey were early and successful organizers of efforts to institute licensing for the practice of planning. Leaders of the American Institute of Planners (succeeded by the American Planning Association), as well as the Canadian Institute of Planners, have taken up the issue and debated the benefits of licensing and weighed alternative criteria which might be employed to distinguish planners from other practitioners. Thus, licensing is a live and current issue among planners. Planners in the sample were asked what they thought about establishing some type of licensing for planning.

Fewer than one-fourth of the planners (22 percent) favored licensing without reservation. Two-fifths (39 percent) opposed any type of licensing. The remainder (39 percent) expressed mixed feelings about licensing. These responses show little support for a measure which would set planners off from other practitioners.

The feeling underlying most planners' responses is ambivalence. A small number are direct in arguing in favor of licensing. They provide good reasons: licensing could improve the quality and status of planning. One exceptionally articulate statement went further, to specify criteria for licensing:

> As much as I hate to say it, I guess I would say a planning degree [should be a requirement], because I know the quality of programs around the nation varies. I am a strong advocate for work experience as well as academic credentials. Perhaps I would put it the way they put it here in relation to jobs. For example, if you have a degree in planning, you can enter at X; if you have a degree in public administration, you might need [to supplement the degree with a certain amount of experience before reaching *X*] . . . . I would like to see testing in specialty areas, probably much like the American Institute of Planners does its testing now. I think that testing is a legitimate function after a period of experience. So it would be the requirement of a degree . . . . I am not sure it would have to be a planning degree [sic] . . . plus some experience, so that someone [just] coming out of school could not be an A.I.P.-licensed planner.

However, most planners favoring licensing were notably vague about what criteria should be set for licensing a practitioner as a planner. For example, one planner who declared that licensing was 'urgently' needed offered the following response when asked what criteria he would establish:

> Degrees and experience. It would be hard to say specifically what. I have faith in the American Institute of Planners. I don't know what subject areas. They [licensed planners] had better know some engineering.

The planners expressing mixed feelings about licensing represent best the feelings of the planners in the sample. They find themselves drawn toward licensing for varying combinations of practical and symbolic reasons. The practical benefits of being able to protect work from others are appreciable. Yet more important may be the symbolic and psychological rewards: licensing would bring planners self-respect, as well as the esteem of others. However, planners are uneasy about instituting protectionist licensing to restrict an area of practice. Somehow, it would seem, the quality of a practitioner's work should be sufficient to ensure employment. Planners are not convinced that licensing procedures identify the best practitioners. In general, they are uneasy about delineating an area of practice for planners because they think that planning is too broad (or vague) an activity to draw any clear boundaries around.

These ambivalences come across in statements from two planners expressing mixed feelings toward licensing. The first is a young county planner:

> On the one hand, part of me says yes . . . the part that wants security, more money. Basically it is a union card, a way of keeping people in and out. I wouldn't have a problem with the license. If I wanted it, I could get it. It is a way of raising the salaries of planners. With regard to the quality of planning, it would not have anything to do with the quality of planning, because once people got their license, they would believe that they could do anything they wanted. I don't think they would ever take anyone's license away.

An older planner shared his mixed feelings in this way:

> I'm skeptical about the value of this. If it were a measure that would ensure a higher standard of practice, I would be in favor. But I think it is a measure of job control. I seriously question whether, the way it is now, it is a profession at all. There are not too many areas in which we have knowledge beyond that of a qualified technician, and I cannot see too much interest in developing that. There seems to be more

interest in qualifying technicians for a structured set-up than in really increasing professionalism.

Some of the more articulate and lenghty responses came from planners opposed to licensing. They share other planners' questions about whether planning is sufficiently specialized to warrant licensing and doubt whether any possible benefits could outweigh these uncertainties. A public agency administrator opposed to licensing expressed his thinking this way:

I think it is preposterous. I don't know how the hell you can license somebody when you do not have criteria for what it is or what they do. Some kind of membership is okay . . . . I don't think planning is a clearly defined enough discipline to draw a test to say that one guy is a planner and another is not. The value of planning is that it is interdisciplinary. Most of the effective procedures which I see are adopted from management. But there is no body of knowledge, as there is in the field of economics or engineering, and, therefore, you can have people like the planning director I worked for in Pennsylvania, who is one of the most skillful planning directors there is, and he has only a bachelor's degree in political science. That is probably why he is a good planner. He did not muck up his head by going to planning school. I talked with a panel at a university, and I told them that the people I am interested in hiring need to have good research skills and good communication skills. I don't care how good they are technically if they cannot do good research and cannot express themselves in a written and verbal way. That is why I don't think licensing is a good way to measure, because you are not talking about skills that are finely defined.

The question about licensing encourages planners to express a professional consciousness at least in negative terms, by distinguishing planners from other practitioners. However, many planners are not certain how they differ from other practitioners. A majority are hesitant to establish licensing for planning because they are uncertain what boundaries they would draw around their own practice. Some respond to this uncertainty by insisting that they can establish licensing. Some planners acknowledge that this insistence is psychologically reassuring: boundaries believed to be real *are* real. A large number of planners are simply uneasy. On the one hand, they continue to perform work which is called 'planning.' Nevertheless, they would not want to be pressed to articulate what it is that they do and how it differs from what others do, because they are not sure that they know.

How Do Planners Feel About Professional Organization?

Organization for professional status normally rests on a group of practitioners' shared consciousness of a common interest. Yet planners' statements point to an ambiguous image of the core acts of planning and uncertainty about how to distinguish planners from other practitioners. Even though the planners sampled are members of a professional organization, it is unclear whether they would feel motivated to use such an organization to promote professional interests. In order to explore this issue, planners were asked how important they consider it for every professional planner to belong to the American Institute of Planners.

The planners sampled, who are members of the American Institute of Planners, give, at best, mixed support to the A.I.P.[10] More than one-third (37 percent) said that they regarded A.I.P. membership as 'not at all' or only 'slightly' important for professional planners. One-fourth (26 percent) said that membership was 'moderately' important. Only a little more than one-third (37 percent) assessed membership in the professional organization as either 'considerably' or 'completely' important for every professional planner.

Both supporters and critics of the A.I.P. share similar expectations of the professional organization. They differ primarily in their estimation of the degree to which the Institute does or can satisfy these expectations. Planners' concerns in assessing Institute membership correspond to issues raised in responses to previous questions. Planners tend to have an ambiguous image of what planning is, and they evaluate the professional organization's ability to provide a clear image. Planners also tend to be uncertain about how to draw boundaries between themselves and other practitioners, and they evaluate the organization's ability to identify boundaries.

What unifies these concerns is the psychological unrest associated with them, and many planners comment on the personal security which membership in the professional organization does or could provide them. Repeatedly, planners echo the comment of one planner that 'It is very important to belong to some professional association.' One administrator with two decades of experience commented, 'I feel a certain confidence in being part of a professional organization.'

Planners look to a professional organization to guide them in defining the essence of their work. This concern is expressed by one local planner:

I feel that every professional needs some organization to identify with. Now, whether this organization in fact really does something for the individual as such is another thing. But I think that every professional needs some organization to identify with. I think it holds the profession together. A.I.P. tends to hold the planning profession together. In my particular instance, I deviated a little from planning as such, and yet I've still got a tie with A.I.P., which I intend to continue.

A private consultant elaborated on this concern, alluding also to the external concern of distinguishing planners from other practitioners:

I think a professional needs to have a professional organization to belong to. This is part of being a professional, having an organization that establishes criteria for getting into it, that sets planners apart from the surveyors of New Jersey [where State licensing criteria are seen as defining surveyors as planners]. I think it is very important to have an organization that will qualify you, that has standards to get into it, that sets standards of excellence just to be a member, and then to use that organization to keep you current of the field. I don't think that A.I.P. does this, at least for me. I belong to the National Association of Home Builders. It is much more useful that A.I.P. They send out a lot of useful literature and are doing a lot to keep members out in front of what is happening.

For these planners, membership in a professional organization is crucial insofar as the organization can give definition to what planners do and provide information on techniques which planners may incorporate into their practice. This latter point, technical assistance, is particularly important for private consultants. They feel that they have a critical need for new techniques to use in their practice, although they tend to feel that the Institute is failing in what they regard as its responsibility to develop and disseminate these techniques.

As the planner who referred to licensing in New Jersey indicated, planners also expect a professional organization to demonstrate to others how planners differ from them. Planners want the professional organization to represent them to others on public issues. A local agency administrator expressed his disappointment with the Institute in these terms:

Apart from the *Journal [of the American Institute of Planners]*, I get absolutely nothing out of A.I.P. I am not sure that they have effectively stood up for anything, lobbied for anything, pushed for clarification of public issues.

Most pointedly, many planners expect the professional organization to serve as a political instrument to demonstrate for them their power vis-à-vis others. The psychological salience of this expectation is expressed by one local planner:

It's too bad that it is not doing what it should do. It should be rumbling up on the Hill, getting us money, prominence, instead of all that other piddly crap. We need a big father figure there, a big lobbyist to tell us what to do. Maybe we need a non-planner there, because our purposes are very noble, and they should be protected. Other professions are usurping our responsibility. We need a real florid non-academic. I want a sign from Carter that he is still a planner. We need to influence [President Carter's urban affairs advisor] Stuart Eizenstat. We are really getting coopted.

The hope that a large powerful organization would serve as an umbrella for planners is common.

Yet, beneath these expectations there lies a doubt, a feeling that a professional organization of planners has a difficult task to carry out, if it is to define the domain of planning. Perhaps the organization should not be expected to be able to do more than individual planners can in this regard. Perhaps, indeed, it is irresponsible for planners to expect an organization to act for them. One administrator criticized the A.I.P. sympathetically:

The A.I.P. does not seem to present the practicing professional with very much in terms of useful information. They have made passing attempts to get down to the practical, day-to-day situations. But I am not sure that any professional organization like this can do that. Planning is very difficult to define. No matter how A.I.P. is organized, it is probably not the fault of A.I.P., but the fault of the profession. It is difficult to define why people are in it, what they want from it, what they get out of it, so that any group that represents this body of peculiar individuals has a hard road ahead. The local groups are useful to only a handful of people. I do not see the local groups being helpful. I don't know how it can. It is more a social thing. On the national level, I don't see how they can have an impact. They do not have a clear constituency.

This statement brings the discussion full circle. Planners begin with an ambiguity about what it is that they do. They practice whatever they do with a feeling of isolation from a reference group of colleagues. They have difficulty distinguishing whatever they do from what other practitioners do. All these uncertainties are deeply troubling. Hence they look to the organization of planners to clarify for them and for others just what their work called 'planning' is. Yet they are disappointed with the efforts of the organization. Finally, many feel that perhaps it is inappropriate to expect an organization to resolve personal doubts. Thus they turn further inward, withdrawing from the organization, blaming themselves for their uncertainties, practicing more in isolation, and not finding resolution.

Interpretation: The Institutionalization of Planning in Organizations

Professional status for any group of practitioners entails the demarcation of an area of practice as an exclusive domain. This territory may be informally established by practitioners who distinguish themselves as especially knowledgeable and useful in the area. More formally, the domain of practice may be defined through the institution of statutory licensing procedures. Larson concludes from a study of past professionalization efforts that groups which attain this special status have succeeded because they have combined two essential strategies: development of a specialization of knowledge or expertise, and establishment of control over the market in which their services are purchased.[11]

The relationships between specialization of the central components of practice and market control, on the one hand, and professional consciousness, on the other, are complex. A shared consciousness is necessary for a group of practitioners to develop and to articulate a specialization in the expertise which they exercise. At the same time, as they come collectively to exercise an increasingly specialized—and, therefore, common—expertise, their sense of shared professional consciousness is likely to grow. Development of a consciousness of sharing knowledge or skills is likely to contribute to a consciousness of sharing material interests, such as a share of the labor market. This consciousness of sharing interests may lead to efforts to exact either informal or formal control over the labor market. Simultaneously, success in establishing a secure place in the labor market is likely to contribute to enhanced professional consciousness.

Planners interviewed in this study do not express the group consciousness which may be expected of professionals. They offer general descriptions of the central components of planning. Only a minority feel any definite shared interest with other planners, even though many say that they would like to feel such interest. Further, because few planners can clearly define what they do, most have difficulty distinguishing themselves from other practitioners. While some are concerned about others' incursions into what they feel should be their domain, they have difficulty defining planning in such a way as to provide even an intellectual basis for exclusion. This uncertainty is expressed in extensive ambivalence about or opposition to licensing planners. While many feel that they probably do some tasks better than other practitioners, they have difficulty articulating these distinctions. Instead, they express the hope that planners' work will 'speak for itself' in establishing boundaries around what planners may do better than others. These findings are similar to those of Page and Lang in their study of Canadian planners.[12] Apparently there is something common to planners' work which makes it difficult for practitioners to describe. In order to understand this difficulty, it is helpful to examine the institutionalization of planning functions in bureaucratic organizations and the effects of this process on planners' cognitive specializations, control of the labor market, and professional consciousness.

The Organizational Role of the Planner as Bureaucratic Advisor

The institutionalization of planning functions in public agencies has been a gradual historical development.[13] Today large majorities of planners in both Canada and the United States work as employees in public bureaucracies.[14,15] As bureaucratic employees, these planners usually receive assignments set for them by others above them in the organizational hierarchy. Commonly, top administrators in public agencies pass down assignments in response to problems handed them by elected officials to whom the agency is accountable. Elected officials want advice on which alternative courses of action are open to them in dealing with the problem which they confront. After making an evaluation of alternatives offered by planners, the officials can proceed to make the decisions which they believe will be most likely to solve their problems.

Several characteristics of this advisor role are significant with respect to planners' control over the market for their services. First, as advisors, they are the full-time employees of the client. Where they are not protected by civil service regulations, they work at the pleasure of elected officials. Second, planners are asked to render advice on problems but are asked to leave the actual choice of a solution to the elected officials who are their clients. Third, 'the problem' which is handed over to the planners is usually only some primarily technical component of a larger political problem with which the official is concerned.[16] In fact, the official—or his or her administrative subordinate—may not always directly explain to the planner the relationship between 'the problem' on which the planner is asked to work and the actual problem which concerns the official. In this role, planners have little control over the market for their services. They are employees of large organizations; the work which they do is assigned and defined for them by superordinate administrators; and they are specifically requested to refrain from identifying and implementing a solution for the problem on which they work.

This institutionalization of planning in public agencies, while itself setting limits on planners' control over the market for their services, also has adverse effects on the development of a professional consciousness among planners. First, insofar as planners exercise limited control over their work, they are likely to develop a limited consciousness of themselves as a distinct group of practitioners. However, there is a second, more complex but equally significant, effect of this process on planners' development of a professional consciousness. Planners in public bureaucracies work in roles which are incompatible with traditional and common role expectations among many planning practitioners.

Planners make explicit statements about role expectations in their comments about their personal strengths. They present themselves as intellectual problem-solvers. They tend, additionally, to be vague in describing relationships between themselves as problem-solvers and clients. They imply that they, as expert problem-solvers, are sought out by various clients, among whom they may choose, to provide the rational solutions to their well-defined problems. This role model portrays the planner as an independent professional, like a consulting architect or engineer. Planners report that they received this tacit model in their formal training.[17] This role model is plausible—and attractive—since it is patterned on the traditional models of autonomous professionals, such as physicians or attorneys. However, the role model is an anachronism for planners employed in public agencies as bureaucratic advisors to elected officials.

This incongruity between planners' ideal role model and the actual role which most play contributes to problems in developing a professional consciousness by creating difficulties in describing the central components of planning work. While the intellectual problem-solving of the independent professional model is important in organizational planning positions, employers generally want advice on problems which is sensitive to the political constraints on short-term actions. Planners who aspire to the autonomy of the role of intellectual problem-solver are likely to have difficulty accepting the role of bureaucratic advisor. The incongruity between the two models is likely to be confusing for many planners, who seek to understand and describe what they do in one set of terms while really acting in some significantly different ways. The incongruity is likely to be demoralizing for other planners who want to see themselves as autonomous and yet who would be discouraged to acknowledge that they play a subordinate role in their work. Both of these responses to this situation further limit the likelihood that planners will develop a professional consciousness based on a clear description of the central components of their work.

General, Organizational Skills Required for Planning

There is one other way in which the organizational role of planners contributes an obstacle to the development of a professional consciousness. Not only do incongruities between role expectations and realities make it difficult for planners to identify the skills which they do or should exercise in the organizational role. But, in particular, the types of expertise which are most likely to give planners influence with decision-makers—and which, consequently, may most likely contribute to increased control over the market for planning services—are difficult to reconcile with the model of the independent problem-solving professional. The following articulate description of practice strengths offered by a veteran planner points to contrasts between the expertise which is effective in organizations and the expertise which planners offer in practice:

> I am practical. [It is] the combination of personality and training as a strategist. If there is anybody who can figure out a way to make something happen in a system as complex as this, it is me . . . . I seem to have a higher tolerance, patience. Basically being a secure person . . . . It takes coming into the situation and looking at it, understanding that there are constraints . . . . It's like, in a situation as complicated as this, the person who defines the problem is ahead of the game. If somebody has defined the problem, what they got is one perspective on it. You work to tolerate a high degree of ambiguity and yet constantly seeking to make order out of it.

This planner makes two important observations about the central components of planning in a bureaucratic organization. First, the purpose of planning is described not as problem-solving, but, rather, as problem-formulation. The social and political environment is complex; different actors regard different parts of this environment as problematic; and there is not even a consensus about what 'the problem' is that should somehow be solved. As the planner observes, 'In a situation as complicated as this, the person who defines the problem is ahead of the game.' Planners do not work with readily defined problems but must, instead, work to create some agreement about the definition of a problem which then has some likelihood of being solved.
Second, this planner notes that the task of developing a clear definition of a problem involves not only intellectual skills, but also interpersonal skills. Never is the systematic collection and analysis of copious data sufficient to identify a single correct definition of a problem. Rather, when the planner states that, 'You want to work to bring about some consensus,' he means that planners must confer with interested parties to elicit their views about what is problematic in a situation. Further, this consultative process is complicated by actors' difficulties in articulating their concerns or hesitations in sharing their views with others. In formulating a definition of a problem which has agreement from many parties, a planner's work, which may be described as that of 'a strategist,' rests on the central components of 'tolerance, patience,' 'coming into the situation and looking at it, understanding that there are constraints,' and 'a combination of being able to tolerate a high degree of ambiguity and yet constantly seeking to make order out of it.'
Two characteristics of the central components of the planner's work described here are difficult to reconcile with the expectations of the model of the independent problem-solver. First, as the description indi-

cates, planning practice in bureaucratic organizations involves extensive interdependence with other actors. Hence the central components of this work include interpersonal skills in addition to intellectual skills. Whereas the model of the independent problem-solver would lead planners to describe the primary expertise of planning in purely intellectual terms, these efforts are likely to be vague because they are incomplete. Second, the institutionalization of planning in public agencies has inextricably tied planners to problems which are extremely complex and poorly bounded.[18] In reality there are no specialized techniques, either interpersonal or intellectual, which can be easily applied to these situations. The processes of establishing definitions for problems and of examining alternative responses to them require considerable common sense. The skills involved are general, and sound judgment is as important as any precise calculations.[19] Hence, while the model of the independent problem-solver would lead planners to describe the expertise of planning in terms of specialized skills, these efforts are likely to be vague because they are inaccurate.

Implications for the Professionalization of Planning

Planning, professionalization, or the establishment of an exclusive domain of practice, depends on the ability of planners to define a specialization of expertise and to assert control over the market for their services. Both these accomplishments depend on planners' development of a shared consciousness about what it is that they do and where they want to set boundaries between themselves and other practitioners. This study indicates that planners have not developed a clear image of their practice. They have sought a list of specialized intellectual skills to which they may lay exclusive claim. Most have failed because they have misunderstood the role which most planners play and the types of problems on which planners work.

The strategic implications of these findings are clear for planners who want to lead a movement for licensing and other controls over planners' practice. First, they need to organize planners to present a common public image of what it is that planners do. They may persuade planners that the public image need not be congruent with the day-to-day realities of planning or planners' views of their work.[20] Then planners may seek to present one of several claims to expertise to the general public. They may imitate traditional professional models by claiming specialized intellectual skills and techniques, even though this discussion has indicated why these claims would be difficult to support. Alternatively, they may embrace the role of bureaucratic advisor and present claims to the combination of intellectual and interpersonal skills necessary to be effective and useful in that role. In conjunction with this strategy, they may explicitly argue that general, rather than specialized, skills are appropriate for practitioners who work with social—as contrasted with technical—problems. In doing so, they may insist that the traditional model of the professional with specialized intellectual skills is an anachronism which does not fit the requirements of social problem-solving. They may present themselves as wielders of a combination of general skills which are especially appropriate for social problem-solving.[21]

Yet it is inappropriate to articulate strategies without identifying the goals which they would serve. Planners who are ambivalent about licensing acknowledge the material benefits which they would derive but argue that political support for licensing should come from public and private clients who are satisfied with their work. The only good justification for professionalization is that practitioners' exclusive authority in a particular domain benefits their clients as well as the practitioners themselves. Discussion of strategies for professionalization is premature. First, planners need to articulate for themselves whose interests they want to, and realistically can, serve while working as advisors in bureaucratic organizations. The rest will follow.

NOTES

1 Benveniste calls all these advice-givers 'pundite' and emphasizes their roles as providers of expertise to 'princes' who make decisions. See Guy Benveniste, *The Politics of Expertise*, second edition. San Francisco: Boyd and Fraser, 1977.

2 Although almost all students of the professions agree that a professional consciousness is essential for professionalization, the role which this consciousness is considered to play varies with the orientation of the observer. Those who focus on the 'attributes of a profession' emphasize a checklist of characteristics which a group of practitioners must have in order to be labelled a profession and invariably include this self-consciousness as an essential characteristic. Others who focus on the political relationships between practitioners and their clients argue that autonomy in practice is the empirical distinguishing characteristic of occupations broadly regarded as 'professions' and identify this self-consciousness as an essential motivator to acquire autonomy. For a presentation of the attributional orientation, see Ernest Greenwood, 'Attributes of a Profession,' *Social Work*, vol. 2, 1957, pp. 44-55. For presentations of the political orientation, see Eliot Freidson, *Profession of Medicine*. New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1970; and Magali Sarfatti Larson, *The Rise of Professionalism*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977.

3 Findings from their Environmental Planning in Canada study are presented in John Page and Reg Lang, *Canadian Planners in Profile*. Toronto: Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, 1977; and John E. Page, *Final Report on Results of Survey-Questionnaires*. Toronto: Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, 1978.

4 The findings which will be briefly summarized here do not reflect the complexity of planners' responses, and the reader is referred to the report documents cited above for more details.

5 Robert A. Beauregard, 'The Occupation of Planning: A View from the Census,' *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, vol. 42, 1976, pp. 187-192.

6 American Institute of Planners, 'A.I.P. membership has not changed much since 1965; average about the same but salaries and education higher,' *A.I.P. Newsletter*, vol. 9, 1974, pp. 1-3; and American Institute of Planners, 'Membership Survey from 1976 Roster.' Washington: American Institute of Planners, n.d.

7 The American Institute of Planners recently merged with the American Society of Planning Officials to form the American Planning Association. The new, larger organization includes many public officials and lay persons interested in planning, in addition to practitioners calling themselves 'planners.' The study sample is probably still representative of the practicing 'planners' in the new A.P.A., though this is a matter of speculation.

8 For purposes of comparing sample characteristics, Canadian data are taken from a copy of the Survey Questionnaire used by Page and Lang in which numbers of responses to questions have been filled in by the researchers. It should be noted that the Canadian survey did not ask about planners' racial origins.

9 For discussion of the methods of qualitative research and data analysis, see Robert Bogdan and Steven J. Taylor, *Introduction to Qualitative Research Methods*. New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1975; William J. Filstead, *Qualitative Methodology*. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970; Barney G. Glaser and Anselm L. Strauss, *The Discovery of Grounded Theory: Strategies for Qualitative Research*. Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1967; Leonard Schatzman and Anselm L. Strauss, *Field Research*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1973; and George V. Zito, *Methodology and Meaning*. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1975.

10 As noted above, the American Institute of Planners merged with the American Society of Planning Officials to form the American Planning Association, a single professional organization of people in planning. It seems likely that statements about the A.I.P. could be generalized to any organization of planners, insofar as these statements express expectations of professional organizations or attitudes about them. On the other hand, whether specific evaluations of the performance of the A.I.P. will be repeated in subsequent evaluations of the new A.P.A. is a matter of speculation. Page and Lang's study of Canadian planners shows some assessments of the Canadian Institute of Planners similar to comments in this study about the A.I.P.

11 See discussion in Larson, *op. cit.*, note 2.

12 Page and Lang, *op. cit.*

13 See discussion in Jerome L. Kaufman, 'Contemporary Planning Practice: State of the Art,' in David E. Godschalk (ed.), *Planning in America: Learning From Turbulence*. Washington: American Institute of Planners, 1974.

14 In Canada, 77 percent of Page's and Lang's sample were employed by public agencies. See Page and Lang, *op. cit.* In the United States, 63 percent of practicing planners belonging to the American Institute of Planners in 1976 were employed by public agencies. See A.I.P., n.d., *op. cit.*

15 It should be noted that many planners who work in the private sector work in firms which themselves are bureaucratically organized. Some of this bureaucratization is a reflection of these firms' needs to deal effectively with complex governmental regulations. Some of the bureaucratization represents what is regarded as a reasonable division of labor in large organizations. Whatever the reasons for this bureaucratization, it has effects on planners in the private sector which are similar to those of planners in the public sector. While the following discussion focusses on planners in public bureaucracies, many of the characterizations apply as well to planners in large private firms.

16 The degree to which the planner is confined to rendering technical advice, depends, certainly, on the relationship between the planner and the client.

17 I have analyzed planners' responses to these and other interview questions with respect to planners' models of a practice role. See my 'Cognitive Sensitivity to Organization,' *Policy Analysis*, in press. Respondents' comments indicate that many practitioners desire or tacitly pursue the model of an independent professional. Their statements suggest, further, that this model was transmitted in the educational programs which they attended.

18 This is another way of describing the spread of 'planning' into many areas, where planners have come into contact with lawyers, engineers, managers, and others. The purpose of this conceptualization of this phenomenon is to argue that what is happening is not that planners are working on more types of problems than they once did (for example, 'social' problems in addition to 'physical' problems) but, rather, that planners' careful work on most problems has revealed the problems to be more complex (and broad) than initially believed. In other words, physical planning problems, for example, *are* social planning problems, problems in law, problems in organizational design, and so forth.

19 This description of the work of planning is similar to that offered by a sample of graduates of social policy planning and public policy programs. Describing their reasoning skills, they reported spending 45 percent of their time using some form of 'common sense' and another 30 percent of their time using 'logical or systematic thought.' See Edward M. Bergman, George C. Hemmens, Susan A. Lieberman, and Robert M. Moroney, *The Practitioner Viewpoint: An Exploration of Social Policy Planning Practice and Education, Part 2: The Findings.* Chapel Hill: Department of City and Regional Planning, University of North Carolina, 1976, particularly p. 39. These themes were also prominent among Canadian planners in the Environmental Planning in Canada study. See Page, *op. cit.*; and Page and Lang, *op. cit.*

20 Indeed, this is a lesson which leaders of organized medicine have known for a long time. While 'medicine' publicly appears to be a single group of practitioners unified by scientific tenets and methods, the private reality is a loose, changing coalition of practitioners joined by some combination of scientific and economic interests. See Rue Bucher and Anselm Strauss, 'Professions in Process,' *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 4, 1961, pp. 325-334.

21 I have made this latter argument in 'Cognitive Sensitivity to Organization,' *op. cit.* It should be noted that one strategy which I have not identified would be for planners to make claims to expertise in a substantive area, such as land use or health care. I believe that planning involves a general set of cognitive and interpersonal skills useful in future-oriented problem-solving and that these skills transcend substantive areas. I believe that a general aim of planners should be to develop these skills and to promote future-oriented problem-solving in decision-making. At the same time, individual planners are likely to need and should have expertise in one or more substantive areas in order to make their advice tangible and useful.

BOOK REVIEWS/COMPTES RENDUS

David Canter, *The Psychology of Place.* New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. 198 pp. $19.95 (cloth) $12.95 (PB)

Over the past several years I have read many articles on environmental cognition, most of which were interesting in their own right, but all of which left me with a feeling of 'so what.' There did not seem to be any thread holding them together, nor could I discern how these studies were to be of use to the practitioner. Canter's book has helped me discover the continuity and interrelationships in the field but, unfortunately, has not succeeded in demonstrating how practitioners can incorporate these studies into their work.

The title of the book is misleading, and requires some discussion. The book is not really about psychology *per se.* Rather, it is decidedly multi-disciplinary. Canter's view is that while people in a variety of disciplines (geography, planning, architecture, psychology and sociology) are carrying out research on how people make sense of and cope with their surroundings, no satisfactory overview of the field exists. He argues that what holds these studies together is a concern with places. The use of 'psychology' in the title reflects the fact that the focus of the book is on individuals and their comprehension of the environment. The book is therefore relevant for a variety of disciplines, and draws on material from many sources. For the most part the book does not include studies carried out in the traditional domain of the psychologist, the laboratory, since the main interest is on dealing with environments as experienced. It does, however, build from a base of cognitive theory.

The book is well written and quite readable. It is not excessively technical, nor does it require an understanding of complex statistical procedures. It is relatively free of jargon and may be comfortably read by someone with only a passing acquaintance with the concepts of cognitive psychology.

Canter has also organized the material well, and it follows a logical progression. The first chapter contains a discussion of the nature of places and of cognitive theory, and explores the differences between places and objects. Among the differences are the fact that we participate in places, that our experience of them is multi-modal, that they provide peripheral as well as central information, and that they provide more information than can be processed at any one time. Failure to recognize these aspects of places leads to two misconceptions that have been unfortunately common in the field of environmental cognition. The first is the tendency to look to conventional theories of object cognition to explain theories about cognition of places. The second is the failure to understand that complex conceptual systems are used in responding to or developing images of places, with the implication that perception alone is not enough to explain our understanding of a place.

Following this discussion of the nature of places and appropriate cognitive theory, Canter discusses techniques for revealing cognitive processes about places, cognitive mapping, aspects of distance estimation, methods of describing places, individual differences in environmental cognition, and finally his view of how all this information can be used.

This last chapter ought to hold the book together and give it a sense of purpose, but unfortunately it is not much more enlightening about the applied usefulness of research in environmental cognition than are individual studies. Canter summarizes his view of the practical implications of the research by saying that '*The goal of environmental design is the creation of places*' (page 157). I would argue that the creation of places is only *one* goal of environmental design, and that Canter's passing references to accommodating activities in spaces is not an adequate treatment of the problem. But even if Canter's premise is accepted, it remains difficult to see how to create spaces on the basis of the contents of the book, since his suggestions are both general and conventional. He posits that places are formed by an amalgam of activities, conceptions, and physical attributes; suggests research procedures to enable us to learn about people's cognitive systems; and makes some comments about the task of the design team. Although he advocates user participation in the design process, and suggests some ways in which this can happen, few of the ideas are new to those who have been actively engaged in the field. I had hoped Canter could offer some advice on how to generalize from existing studies to enable the designer to incorporate what is learned from them into new projects, since there is usually neither time nor money to allow us to engage in the necessary user participation for each new project. Reinventing the wheel each time is costly and tiresome, but it is the only solution Canter offers.

In spite of these criticisms, the book could be read usefully by anyone concerned with the relationship between environment and behavior. For those already familiar with the literature it will provide a coherence to the field not otherwise easily found. For others it will constitute a good introduction and, it is to be hoped, increase their awareness of the importance of taking human needs into account in the design and planning process.

Myra Schiff, Toronto

Ian C. Laurie (ed.), *Nature in Cities: The Natural Environment in the Design and Development of Urban Green Space.* Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1979. 428 pp.

As the title indicates, the book deals with preserving, managing and creating natural amenities within urban environments. In this well-organized book, the editor selects a set of studies, each contributing different aspects to the main theme. The contributors are good experts in their fields, and are recruited from different parts of the world, mostly from Europe.

One difficulty with all edited books is that some discontinuity of the main topic is inevitable. One author goes into much detail, applicable only in a limited area; others are more general. Their approaches, methods, and tones also differ, but this is rather an asset than a fault. So is the selection of authors, some coming from academic backgrounds, some from the most direct practitioner fields.

The first section, 'Philosophic context,' discusses the need for natural features in a highly artificial environment. The arguments are convincing, if we need to be convinced at all: the topic is popular and getting more and more so.

It is difficult to pick out the best, most useful reaction from the rest, yet a few sections deserve specific consideration.

Owen Manning gives a 'context of design' dealing with motivations and the necessity of 'clear statement of principles.' He himself put down a few of them, as the emphasis of potentials and possible advantages, not only constraints as dealt with by the majority of writers. The relation of planning to, and its basis in the life sciences is concisely and clearly pointed out, although this section deserves more elaboration. 'Formal relationships in naturalistic design' and his nine guiding principles are a really useful part of this paper, and give a certain 'philosophical' base for the planner. The bibliography of this section is extensive and up to date, including some 1977 publications.

Editor Ian Laurie's paper about nineteenth century planning is a concise summary not only of the actual planning but also of the ideas, ideals, and attitudes of the society behind landscape and regional design. This knowledge of the relevant resources is impressive, including, for instance, literature of the 1850s and 1860s. On the other hand the bibliography is too short.

Natural resource assessment could be one of the most useful sections for the planner (including what is called in Canada 'Environmental Impact Assessment'). Regretfully, the author compressed, or rather overcompressed, this section, perhaps because of limited space. The bibliography is definitely inadequate and does not include the best sources.

Chapters 4-8 are rather specific but include good European and other examples.

'Natural Character in Urban Space' (Chapters 9-16) is a somewhat misleading title. This section does not deal with general natural characteristics of cities but rather with foreign, mostly European, examples. However, this does not detract from its value for the planner. It shows different approaches, solutions and methods, and how specific planning problems were handled in different countries. Many of these can be applied, *mutatis mutandi,* in North American cities to help planners with specific orientations for preserving, integrating, and maintaining natural assets within a general urban plan.

The usefulness of this book is without question: it should be present on the shelves of every planning office and of every planner.

Eugene Mattyasovszky, Toronto

Elizabeth Pacey, *The Battle of Citadel Hill.* Hantsport, N.S.: Lancelot Press, 1979. 151 pp. (PB)

On March 14, 1974, the City of Halifax amended its zoning bylaw to preserve ten views from four viewpoints on Citadel Hill. Until the late sixties, this historic landmark commanded a sweeping view of the harbor and the city. Then came the highrise building boom. In a straightforward, blow by blow report, Elizabeth Pacey recounts the long five year battle fought by Haligonians to save what they could of the panoramic view from the intrusion of office and hotel towers.

There are two threads to the Citadel Hill story. One, the methods thread, follows the evolution of the views protection bylaw itself. Basically, the issues were how should the view be defined and how should it be protected. At one extreme was a proposal that called for the complete preservation of the existing view, in all seventeen views from three viewing points. At the other was a five view proposal involving four viewing points. Numerous other proposals were alternately forwarded and rejected before Council reached its compromise position. Pacey briefly summarizes an interesting report, (*Views from Citadel Hill: Halifax, N.S. Proposed Bylaw June 1973*), prepared by Professor Hakim of the School of Architecture, Nova Scotia Technical College, which evaluated the various options both quantitatively and qualitatively.

The other more dominant thread focuses on the process of planning and decision-making. Here is Pacey's real interest. An active participant in the controversy, she experienced first-hand the arbitrariness of the planning and decision-making arena where personalities (who's involved and what are their beliefs and values) are oftentimes the deciding factor. Her exposé of the planning process provides a nice counterpart to our cherished rational decision-making models.

Overall, the story is well told. The only distracting feature was her tendency to be overdramatic and to gloat over the defeat of her opponents (in describing the City Manager's fall from power, for example, she notes 'Henderson's power had not only diminished but his physical appearance had altered quite dramatically. The ruddy glow of his complexion was drained; the glitter had gone from his eyes and the smile of confident superiority from his lips. He looked, suddenly, old').

Of what value is the book to planners specifically? Of limited value for three reasons. First, her analysis of the method underlying the views restriction bylaw is sketchy. Someone interested in learning more about methods and techniques for protecting scenic resources would be better off to consult Christopher Tunnard, *A World With a View*.[1] Second, she does not fully address the key point of contention, namely that views restriction would adversely affect the rate of development and the tax base. The arguments for and against the bylaw are noted but not developed. And so the case for views protection remains a precarious one. And third, she does not step back from the problem to examine its broader implications. What would have made the book more useful would have been an analysis of the underlying factors at work; the role of the growth paradigm in shaping professional judgement, for example. Pacey too easily accepts the positions of the City's planners and councillors as reflections of personality traits. The influence of professional training is not examined. Similarly, she interprets the interaction between City Council, staff and the public in the standard facile fashion. Council is weak, easily hoodwinked by a strong, self-serving staff, and both pay only lip service to the public. Guy Beneviste's more penetrating analysis of such relationships, applied to this situation, may have revealed the subtler aspects of the process.[2] By not going beyond the surface of the conflict, Pacey forfeited a chance to offer some insight into battles of this kind, insights that others could use to sort out and understand their own Citadel Hill.

NOTES

1 Christopher Tunnard, *A World with a View: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scenic Values*. New York: Yale University Press, 1968.
2 Guy Beneviste, *Politics of Expertise*. Berkeley, Calif.: Glendessary Press, 1972.

Audrey Armour, Toronto

Donald M. McAllister, *Evaluation in Environmental Planning: Assessing Environmental, Social, Economic and Political Trade-offs*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 308 pp. $24.95 (cloth)

Donald McAllister has written a most welcome and refreshing book. The style is lively and direct. He puts his ideas across in a way that alerts the reader to the richness and historical depth of the themes he presents. He warns that the nature, fluidity, and variety of our own values transcend anything that is captured in the evaluation techniques now so extensively applied in environmental planning.

The book is divided into three parts with the first looking at ethics and values. American writers and thinkers get the lion's share of the attention. European philosophies of the Classical Period and the Enlightenment are quoted, but this is largely because they influenced American thought of the Revolutionary Period. This emphasis sets the tone for the whole book. United States' preoccupations dominate right to the last paragraph—which is a quote from Dewey. This is unfortunate because it tends to mask the relevance of McAllister's conclusions for other countries and planning regimes.

The words of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth century partisans of democracy and conservation are sympathetically reported—the point being to establish a role for participatory democracy in the evaluation process and to make the reader responsive to the long run importance of environmentalist values. These, the author clearly feels, are vital if the temptation to slide into a technical approach to evaluation dominated by economic rationales is to be avoided. A possibly stronger antidote to this mode of thought, however, is given in the second and most novel chapter of the book which deals with the psychological sources of expressed values. Our hopes and wishes are shown to be transitory things harried by our desire to accept and be accepted and to reach a contented accommodation with our surroundings and neighbors. This is a cautionary and perhaps humbling prelude to the following discussions of ethics and techniques.

The second and longest part of the book looks at methods. Cost-benefit analysis gets the most attention. It is followed by a review of Morris Hill's 'Goals Achievement Matrix' and Nathaniel Lichfield's 'Planning Balance Sheet.' Then several methods that lack the depth or breadth to be regarded as complete in themselves are assessed and this part of the book is wrapped up by discussion of a number of case studies in citizen participation.

The coverage is brisk and selective. The author does not attempt to map the methods completely. For most of the techniques this is wise because for them many variations exist on the same theme and only the theme itself, perhaps buttressed by one or two case studies, needs exposition; but, for cost-benefit analysis it is a mistake. There is a sequential analytical process involved in cost-benefit analysis and this must be followed if the technique is to be understood. By being selective McAllister fails to convey a grasp of the technique as a whole even though the juiciest and most contentious ingredients are served up to the reader.

In his discussion of incomplete methods (impact analysis, landscape suitability analysis, and energy analysis are the ones selected), McAllister wisely emphasizes their potentially valuable, if limited, contribution. Readers are warned that exaggerated claims for some of them have been floated and that it is essential to realize, for instance, that energy analysis may have a lot to say about energy content but that energy content is not value content and should never be construed as such.

McAllister's strongest point in this part of the book is his well argued opposition to the 'grand index' approach to evaluation. The 'grand index' is based on the enduring myth that there exists a valid procedure which will produce a 'correct' quantitative answer in evaluating a proposal. Chief villain in propagating this error is cost-benefit analysis. McAllister offers an alternative approach that is an attitude of mind rather than a specific methodology — and this is his topic in the concluding part of his book.

The central purpose of evaluation, as McAllister conceives it, is to help citizens reach personal judgements regarding the desirability of plans on the basis of the best obtainable information. He feels that the existing set of tools is adequate to serve this function if it is applied with wisdom and sensitivity. People must eventually make judgements applying their own values, hopes, concerns, and goals. It is a disservice to attempt to impose other values on them even if these are called community values. And it is a worse disservice to confront them with an evaluation study that is unintelligible either because the methodology is abstruse or because there are conscious or unconscious manipulations of the importance attached to the impact quantities or values generated.

McAllister is clearly aware of the deficiencies (and merits) of existing techniques and feels that they are in general misdirected. None of the methods he describes was designed with the single intent of serving the demands of participants in the decision making process. Such a method would have to meet the following minimum requirements:

1 It should present information in as succinct and comprehensible a manner as possible.
2 It should be compatible with the decision making process.
3 It should not automatically exclude plausibly influential values.
4 It should identify and address all objectives that are directly or indirectly important to all groups concerned with, or significantly affected by, the decision to be made.
5 It should explicitly recognize all groups with a significant interest in the decisions to be made.

There are some striking omissions from the book. The most glaring of these are the exclusion of modern theorists from Part I and the failure to mention notable recent efforts to broaden the basis of evaluation studies. John Rawls [1] whose brilliant attempt to fuse humanitarian ethics and a theory of democratic government has triggered a resurgence of interest in the modern value of political philosophy surely deserves consideration. Rawls even provides an alternative to the Pareto and Hicks-Kaldor criteria for a social welfare improvement.

The critique of the primacy of economic values would be strengthened by reference to the writings of authors such as Mishan,[2] an expert in cost-benefit analysis only too ready to scold those who cannot think beyond it, Hirsch[3] and Scitovsky.[4] The recent efforts of the Water Resources Council in the United States to broaden the scope of evaluation procedures and use them to present options to decision makers are worthy of mention in Part II. The Council proposes a compendium of cost-benefit analyses, environmental impact studies, and evaluation against regional planning objectives as a comprehensive evaluative methodology. In using these techniques the weight attached to each is varied in assessing alternative options so that decision makers can see the implications of potential trade-offs.

These omissions detract less than might be expected from the book. This is because what McAllister has to say is eminently sensible and the advocative aspect of the book survives intact.

NOTES

1 John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*. Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1971.
2 E.J. Mishan, *The Costs of Economic Growth*. Harmondsworth, Eng.: Penguin, 1967.
3 Fred Hirsch, *Social Limits to Growth*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976.
4 Tibor Scitovsky, *The Joyless Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976.

Michael C. Poulton, Vancouver

LETTER TO THE EDITOR/LETTRE AU REDACTEUR

The most disappointing aspect of Barry Cullingworth's review of our *Urban and Regional Planning in a Federal State: The Canadian Experience* in the June 1979 issue is that he did not *describe,* let alone critically discuss, the purposes, structure, contents, or substance of the book. At a minimum, this is a reviewer's responsibility. Anyone reading his review would have no idea about the specific content of the book—except that it deals with 'Canadian experience' and includes 'case studies'; true enough, but what Canadian experience and which case studies? It was kind of Barry to state that our 'editorial sections are perceptive and stimulating.' A pity his review of the book stems less from a fully appreciative perception of the Canadian planning scene than it does from his personal proclivities. Any Canadian teacher knows of the need in our schools for publications which offer to Canadian students an historical appreciation of the many facets of planning in our country and their equally varied institutional contexts. To criticize the book for unmanageable (or unattainable) breadth is to ignore the evolution and immense diversification of Canadian planning practices over the past twenty years. But, most important, to make such a criticism without explaining the basis for it by reference to the actual contents of the book is inexcusable.

Not a word is said about the fact that the twenty-odd essays in our book are organized around what we consider to be a more or less common set of conditions or forces that give rise to contemporary practices of planning in all industrialized or industrializing countries: namely, urbanization and settlement patterns; natural resource development and the environment; the use, management and control of land; organization for public planning and development; and public participation in planning and environmental decision-making. Even if it is difficult to do justice completely and accurately to the total Canadian experience, as Barry asserts, and which we ourselves acknowledge in the book, it behooves him at least to describe and comment on the experience (and the case studies) that we *have* dealt with.

Barry states that with twenty-five contributors, the quality and 'arguably' the relevance of the contributions *inevitably* varies. By what logic does this inevitability arise? Do they in fact vary? Cullingworth says nothing on this. Moreover, in making this claim, he doesn't note that half of the contributions were commissioned especially for the authors' purposes, which in itself is quite unusual for 'readers' similar to ours. But the important point is that our approach of commissioning chapters at least goes a long way toward overall consistency and integration, and even the 'synoptic view' Barry calls for. Whether we succeeded is another question.

On the matter of the book's price tag of $65, Barry is entitled to be outraged. We are outraged too. But surely a little reflection would have caused Barry to temper his remarks. He might even have pitied the authors instead of tarring them with the publisher's brush. Ourselves and Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross (who put out the excellent Community Development Series, and with whom we originally contracted) were appalled by the shafting given the book by McGraw-Hill Ryerson (of Toronto!) at publication time. As anyone who publishes knows, academic authors seldom, if ever, have control over pricing.

Barry clearly wishes we had put together a book of *his* design (though what that would be is never made clear); in *his* conception of 'case studies;' *his* length; and for *his* price. He rambles over column space in an effusion of persuasions to do it all differently than we did.

As far as we are aware, the book is a first attempt to describe and evaluate Canadian planning practices in a reasonably comprehensive fashion. In short, we would have wished more discussion of what is *in* the book, and less of what Barry thinks the design, length and price should have been.

William T. Perks, Ira M. Robinson
University of Calgary

BOOKS RECEIVED/NOUVELLES ACQUISITIONS

We welcome requests to review listed books. Please contact the Reviews Editor.

Agger, Simona Ganessi, *Urban Self-Management: Planning for a New Society.* New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc., 1979. 235 pp. $18.50 (cloth)

Appleyard, Donald (ed.), *The Conservation of European Cities.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979. 308 pp. $25.94 (cloth)

Artibise, Alan F.J., and Stelter, Gilbert A. (eds.), *The Usable Urban Past: Planning and Politics in the Modern Canadian City.* (*Carleton Library no. 119*). Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1979. 383 pp. $10.95 (pb)

Bernhardt, Arthur D., *Building Tomorrow: The Mobile/Manufactured Housing Industry.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 523 pp. $37.50 (cloth)

Ciucci, Giorgio, *et al, The American City from the Civil War to the New Deal.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979. 563 pp. $50.00 (cloth)

Frenette, Sybil, and Herscovitch, Judy, *The Apartment Tenant Relocation Study.* Winnipeg: University of Winnipeg, Institute of Urban Studies, Feb. 1978. 52 pp.

Friedmann, John, *The Good Society.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979. 199 pp. $15.00 (cloth)

Golant, Stephen M., *Location and Environment of Elderly Population.* New York, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1979. 214 pp. $17.95 (cloth)

Gunn, Clare A., *Tourism and Planning.* New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1979. 371 pp. $19.50 (cloth)

Herbert, D.T., and Johnston, R.J. (eds.), *Geography and the Urban Environment: Progress in Research and Applications.* Vol. 2. New York, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1979. 308 pp.

McAllister, Donald M., *Evaluation in Environmental Planning; Assessing Environmental, Social, Economic, and Political Trade-offs.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 308 pp. $24.95 (cloth)

O'Riordan, Timothy, and d'Arge, Ralph C. (eds.), *Progress in Resource Management and Environmental Planning.* Vol. 1. New York, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1979. 326 pp. $38.50 (cloth)

Reps, John W., *Cities of the American West: A History of Frontier Urban Planning.* Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979. 827 pp. $75.00 (cloth).

Rosen, Kenneth T., *Seasonal Cycles in the Housing Market: Patterns, Costs, and Policies.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979. 167 pp. $21.00 (cloth)

Sinden, John A., and Worrell, Albert C., *Unpriced Values: Decisions Without Market Prices.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979, 511 pp. $25.95 (cloth)

Solomon, Arthur P. (ed.), *The Prospective City; Economic, Population, Energy, and Environmental Developments Shaping Our Cities and Suburbs.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1980. 491 pp. $27.50 (cloth)

Stelter, Gilbert A., and Artibise, Alan F.J. (eds.), *The Canadian City: Essays in Urban History.* (Carleton Library no. 109). Toronto: Macmillan Co. of Canada, 1979. 454 pp. $10.95 (pb)

Tindal, C.R., and Tindal, S. Nobes, *Local Government in Canada; An Introduction.* Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson Ltd., 1979. 159 pp.

Weinberg, Nathan, *Preservation in American Towns and Cities.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979. 233 pp. $18.50 (cloth)

CONTENTS OF OTHER JOURNALS/ SOMMAIRES D'AUTRES REVUES

Journal of the American Planning Association

published quarterly by the American Planning Association
1776 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
Editor, Kenneth T. Pearlman
January 1980 issue

Canadian Public Policy

published quarterly
Editorial Office, Arts Building
University of Guelph
Guelph, Ontario N1G 2W1
Editor, J. Vanderkamp

Selected Contents

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