Wittgenstein and empiricism about other minds

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1975-09

Authors

Black, John A.

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I compare two approaches to the refutation of skepticism about other minds. One is due to Wittgenstein, the other stems from the writings of such philosophers as Rorty, Putnam and the identity-theorists; the latter view I call empirical realism. The Wittgenstein approach has been taken by its opponents to rest on the claim that psychological terms are governed by criteria, largely because of the writings of such as Malcolm and Strawson. I argue that the Wittgensteinian refutation of skepticism is independent of this claim, and also works as a refutation of some of the central tenets of empirical realism. This requires a reinterpretation or at least a new version of the private language argument, and one which makes no appeal to the notion of "criterion". Here I draw on and attempt to develop a version suggested by Lawrence Resnick. In passing I assess the relevance of this argument to other forms of skepticism. As preliminaries to this major aim I consider in detail an argument in favour of skepticism about other minds and chart the logic of the two approaches under consideration. I then consider a batch of arguments developed by Putnam against the Wittgensteinian position and show that they apply only to some misinterpretations of Wittgenstein by Malcolm. Alongside the main conclusion of the essay I try to develop a notion of "criterion" which will avoid the objections of Putnam and Rorty and enable me to preserve the claim that psychological terms are for the most part governed by criteria. A major element in this attempt is the denial of what I take to be the Malcolmian thesis that terms must be governed by criteria in order for them to have meaning. Instead, I suggest that it is closer to both Wittgenstein and the truth to say that, as a matter of fact, some expressions are governed by criteria and that this is sufficient to guarantee them meaning. I make some speculative remarks about how the distinction between expressions governed by criteria and those not so-governed might be made out. I conclude the essay with a brief adjudication of the dispute between the two approaches, coming out in favour of that of Wittgenstein.

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